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Septertfoer 22, 1983

Mr. Ed.
Business
local 144 Division 100
S«E,I.U,, &FL-CXQ

233 Hast 49th Street
New York, New York 10019
Dear Eds
I return to you herewith two corrected originals
of- iiy arbitration award aad opinion in the nmtterLocal 144, Division 100 and Melphi University.
Sincerely,

Eric J.
sp
Encl.

E R I C J. SCH M E R T Z

P. C.
HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
HEMPSTEAD, NEW YORK US5O
(516) 5 S O - 5 8 S 4

April 17, 1983

Mr. Peter Ottley
President, Loc^l 144
Hotel, Hospital, Nursing
Home & Allied Services Union,
SEIU, AFL-CIO
233 West 49th Street
New York, New York 10019
Morris Tuchman, Esq.
Gluck and Tuchman
1270 Broadway
New York, New York 10001

t

RE: Local 144 SEIU -andSheepshead Nursing Home
Gentlemen:
The mediation effort in the above matter having
failed, I enclose to you each herewith my fact-finding
recommendations.

Very truly yours,

Eric J. Schmertz
Fact-Finder
EJS:hl
Encl.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION
ONE EXECUTIVE DRIVE, SOMERSET, N.J.08873
(201) 560-9560

RICHARD NAIMARK
Regional Director

April 22,

MARIANNE ADAMS
Assistant Regional Director

L.A. Local
Attention: i-atrick D. Ryan
'iov.tr iiuilcing, Suite 23
Route 2'i &nc Par&oridgc Road
i-Cison, New Jc-rsc> O^S.^0

i<&: & 3V GGJ'>
u.A. i-OCAL
AND
j^UiijUv. ^LKViCL idi-fcC IkiC AND

Put lie Service Electric & Gas Company
Attention: IV.T. C. '^. Cwrevenitz
P. O, t>ox >/'C, "i 10A
i, Ne^ Jersey 07101

CRV:

Dear Parties:
itnce Jui> 2>, ib*Sj» was not acceptable, Arbitrator bchnitrti i\«i& nc-vv propcseu
August 23, 1>'&J or August 2^, 1V&3 at lOsOO A. to. to schecult- the hearing.
iht- Parties are requested to advise tiie Association it ttse above i* acceptable by
April 2y, i^&3. If, however, the Association does rsot hear to the contrary uy April
25#, 11*3(3 it *iil be assunr.ee that all eates proposed are satisfactory ana d ForiMJ
Notice of Htrdnng uill be issued.
Very truly yours,

Marianne

Lnrector

cc: Lric 6chrriertz
Daniel Hussey, Esq.

Offices: Boston • Charlotte • Chicago • Cincinnati « Cleveland • Dallas » Detroit « Hartford • Los Angeles « Miami • Minneapolis « New Jersey
New York • Philadelphia • Phoenix • Pittsburgh • San Diego • San Francisco • Seattle • Syracuse • Washington, D.C.
HEADQUARTERS:

140 West 51st Street, New York, N.Y. 10020

>i3

REGISTERED NURSES GUILD
LICENSED PRACTICAL NURSES GUILD
CIVIL SERVICE GUILD
TECHNICAL GUILD
CLERICAL & NON-PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES
PUBLIC SER VICE EMPLOYEES - Dl VIS/ON 100

HOTEL, HOSPITAL, NURSING HOME & ALLIED SERVICES UNION
233 WEST 49th S T R E E T , NEW Y O R K , NEW Y O R K 10019
DIVISION 100

549 Broadway, Massapequa, New York

11758

(212) 265-2366-7-8-9

(516)541-6006

President

Secretary-Treasurer

Sept. 14, 1983
Executive Vice President

General Organizer

Vice President

Vice President

Vice President

Vice President

Recording Secretary

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
Hofstra Univ. School of Law
Hempstead, New York 11550
Dear Eric:
Enclosed please find a corrected original
of your arbitration award. The discrepancy
occurs on page seven. Kindly change April to
August in the second and third year so it will
be consistent with the award.

Sergeant-at-Arms

Sincerely,

Ed Picciano
Business Representative
Local 144 Division 100
S.E.I.U., AFL-CIO

EP/av

AFFILIATED WITH SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO

Voluntary Labor Arbitration
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 144, Divison 100 Service
Employees International Union,
AFL-CIO

AWARD

and

Adelphi University
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

x

The stipulated issue is:
What, if any, modifications shall be
in the collective agreement which expired
on July 31, 1982 and which shall thereafter
constitute a successor contract of three
years' duration from August 1, 1982 through
July 31, 1985?
A hearing was held before me on May 4, 1983 at the
Hempstead Holiday Inn in Hempstead, New York.

Both parties

were offered full opportunity to offer evidence, to examine
and cross-examine witnesses and to present argument in support
of their respective contentions.
There are approximately seventy employees in the
unit.

The most recent collective agreement expired on July

31, 1982.

The parties continued to abide by the contract's

provisions while negotiations were continuing.

Despite the

best efforts of the negotiators, an agreement could not be
reached and on March 17, 1983, Local 144 struck the University.

At a negotiation session on April 1, 1983, the parties agreed
to submit their dispute to binding arbitration and on April
4, 1983, members of Local 144 returned to work.
The Union seeks an 8% increase in wages to the bargaining unit each year of the contract, retroactive to August 1,
1982.

It contends that this proposal is justified based upon

Adelphi's bargaining history of agreeing to a wage increase
comparable to those contained in the collective contracts covering building and ground maintenance employees at C.W. Post
College and at Hofstra University.

The Union considers that

Adelphi's refusal to increase wages is a departure from its
"traditional bargaining pattern" of following "traditional
competitors" who are also suffering loss of enrollment and
icnreased costs.

The Union argues that it is asking "for no

more or less than it has in the past."
The Union also seeks increased payments to its Welfare
Fund of $.50 per week per employee to maintain medical benefits
at their present level and to prevent loss of medical coverage.
The increased contribution is necessary, it argues, due to
the increased cost of medical care.
The University does not dispute its practice of negotiating a wage increase comparable to those contained in the
C.W. Post and Hofstra contracts.

However, Adelphi claims that

its financial condition is so poor that regardless of its history
of bargaining with Local 144, any increase in its labor costs
is unjustified.

In short, Adelphi contends that it simply

does not have the means to meet any increase in costs.
-2-

Specifically, Adelphi refers to its current running
deficit of nearly 2 million dollars, the decrease in student
enrollment for the current academic year which resulted in
an additional loss of revenues of approximately 3.5 million
dollars, and a statistician's prognosis for further decreases
in enrollment for next year which would result in an additional
substantial loss of revenues.
Adelphi further pointed to cost-saving measures which
have affected faculty (through savings in part-time and overload), administrators and non-bargaining unit staff, contending
that the bargaining unit members should also contribute to
help alleviate the University's desperate financial problem.
The University considers a wage increase plainly unjustified
and unfair in view of the financial picture and the sacrifices
by non-unit personnel.
The University also seeks concessions from the Union
by proposing modifications to the break time provisions contained
in Article VIII of the contract and sick leave provisions contained in Article XIII in an effort to reduce costs and to increase
productivity.
As to the wage increases at C.W. Post and Hofstra,
the University pointed out that the approximately $21 average
increase sought by Local 144 for the first year of the contract
exceeds and is not in line with the average wage increases
in the first year of $17 per week at Hofstra and $20 per week
at C.W. Post.
-3-

Discussion and Findings
I have concluded that the University has plainly
established its current fiscal crisis justifying a departure
from its bargaining history of negotiating terms comparable
to those at C.W. Post and at Hofstra.
The University submitted into evidence eight exhibits
which demonstrate that its financial condition for the current
fiscal year is extremely poor.

The University's "Financial

Statements" for the year ended August 31, 1982 prepared by
its accountants, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., records a net
decrease of current funds for the year of $395,599 and an accumulated fund deficit as of August 31, 1982 of $1,801,571.00.
That deficit was subsequently compounded by a dramatic
decrease in enrollment in September 1982, as recorded in the
University's Registrar's Report, "21st Day - Fall 1982."

In

terms of lost tuition, fees and miscellaneous revenues such
as room, board, lab fees, etc., the decreased enrollment of
approximately 630 Full Time Equivalents Students (FTE's) resulted
in an additional $3,532,607.00 decrease in revenues.
Other documents in evidence suggest further decreases
in student enrollment, the University's primary source of revenues, in the years ahead.

The report entitled "Executive Summary

- Long Island Region" (Prepared by the New York State Department
of Education - 1977) states that "the population of the traditionally aged college student is projected to decrease substantially
on Long Island" and predicts that enrollment will be down by
35.5% by the year 1992 from the 1977 level.

Also, in evidence is a summary of a projection of
student enrollment at Adelphi for Fall 1983, calculated by
Ms. D. Zeitzer,a statistician and data analyser employed on
a grant by Adelphi.

Her prediction of the "likely" enrollment

would result in yet another 3.2 million dollar decrease in
revenues next fall.
Moreover, although in prior years Adelphi followed
the C.W. Post and Hofstra negotiations with comparable wage
increases, the "Registrar's Records" of enrollments for the
nine year period from 1974 through 1982 record that prior to
1982, Adelphi's enrollment increased each year.

Accordingly,

the bargaining history for those years cannot be relied upon
to justify the Union's wage demands for the year 1982-1983
when the University suffered its first and dramatic decrease
in enrollment.
The University further established that cost savings
have been realized from a diverse cross section of its personnel,
including reduction of part-time and overload for faculty and
salary reductions for administrators and staff.

The University

has also cut costs by reducing the budgets in all areas, implementing a hiring freeze and reducing its reserve funds and
funds for plant improvement.

Accordingly, the University has

taken many measures short of laying off personnel to lessen
its deficit.

Despite this effort, the current year's deficit

was still not erased.
Finally, it appears that the University cannot fund
a wage increase for the bargaining unit at this time by raising
tuition.

The record reveals that Adelphi's tuition for both

graduates and undergraduates already exceeds that of C.W. Post
and Hofstra which the Union concedes are Adelphi's competitors.
Finally, the University introduced testimony concerning
the high cost of coffee breaks to the University.
fifteen minute

The two

coffee breaks provided for in the expired con-

tract have in practice been stretched to 25-30 minutes because
employees have been taking their breaks away from the job sites.
Based upon the foregoing evidence, I conclude that
increasing the cost of the collective agreement to the University, particularly for the first year of the contract, is not
justified.

This does not preclude, however, wage increases

which are offset by cost-savings concessions by the bargaining
unit.
Consistent with this analysis, the award which follows
provides that wage adjustments will be funded by a reduction
in coffee break time.
have an option.

In the first year, the employees will

They may choose to give up both coffee breaks

to have their wages increased by $17/week or an average increase
of approximately 6.8% (assuming an average salary of $250 per
week).

The employees would be permitted, under this option,

to drink coffee (which they previously brought to work) at
their work site, provided that they do not discontinue work
any longer than necessary to finish their coffee promptly.
Alternatively, they may choose to retain a ten-minute coffee
break in the morning only.

In return for their give back of

5 minutes of the morning break and the 15 minute afternoon
break, the wages shall be increased by $11 per week, an average
increase of 4.4% (assuming an average salary of $250 per week).
-6-

The wage adjustments in both options, shall be effective as of April 4, 1983, the date the strike ended.
In either option, the wage adjustment is fully off
set by the reduction in coffee break time and the resultant
increase in productivity.
The reduction of coffee break time shall continue
in the second and third years of the contract consistent with
the option chosen in the first year and shall therefore continue
to offset wage adjustments in the second and third years.
Wages shall be increased in the second year, effective
August 1, 1983, by $18 per week, an average increase of 6.7%
(assuming the $17 per week option was exercized in the first
year).

In the third year, effective August 1, 1984, wages

shall be increased by $19 per week, an average increase of
6.67% (assuming the $17 per week option was exercized in the
first year).

These increases, in addition to being offset

by the continued reduction in coffee break time, are comparable
to the wage increases at C.W. Post, Hofstra, Bowling College,
and Southampton College according to record evidence.
In addition, to maintain the present level of medical
coverage and benefits, the University's contribution to the
Welfare Fund shall be increased by fifty (50) cents for each
year of the contract.
AWARD
The undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator,
having been duly sworn and having heard the proof and arguments
of the parties, hereby renders the following Award:

I.

WAGES

A.

The Union shall have the following option:
(1)

In lieu of both the morning and afternoon
coffee breaks for the term of the contract,
wages shall be increased by $17.00 per
week, effective April 4, 1983. However,
employees may drink coffee at their specific
work area, provided they do not disrupt
their work any longer than necessary to
drink their coffee promptly, or

(2)

In lieu of five (5) minutes of the morning
coffee break and the entire afternoon coffee
break for the term of the contract, wages
shall be increased by $11.00 per week,
effective April 4, 1983. The morning coffee
break shall not exceed ten (10) minutes.

B. The Union shall notify the Employer as to whether
it has chosen option (1) or option (2) within ten (10) days
of this Award. If the Employer has not been so notified, the
Employer may implement either option.
C. Effective August 1, 1983, wages shall be increased
by $18.00 per week.
D. Effective August 1, 1984, wages shall be increased
by $19 . 00 per week.
II.

WELFARE FUND

A. Employer payments to the Welfare Fund shall be
increased by fifty (50) cents per week per employee effective
August 1, 1982.
B. Employer payments to the Welfare Fund shall be
increased by an additional fifty (50) cents per week per employee, effective August 1, 1983.
C. Employer payments to the Welfare Fund shall be
increased by an additional fifty (50) cents per week per employee, effective August 1, 1984.

-8-

All other proposals for modification of the contract
presented to the Arbitrator are denied.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator
ate of New York
"County of Nassau
SS'
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath
as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my RULING.

-9-

SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
In the Matter of the Arbitration
Between
AIR CARGO INC. ("ACI")

AWARD

and

LOCAL 851, INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS
The Undersigned, duly designated as the System Board of
Adjustment and as the Arbitrators, and having duly heard the
proofs and allegations of the above-named parties make the
following AWARD:
1.

The long-standing practice of some drivers clocking

in and out, as directed, at American and United airlines, rather
than at the Employer's terminal, is a matter of "status quo."
Therefore the Employer's direction to continue that arrangement
was proper.

The Union's request for a cease and desist order

is denied.
2.

The Davidoff-Tidona agreement of July 2, 1982 to

permit overtime and work on the sixth and seventh day despite
layoffs appears to have been applicable to the specific
circumstances then present.

We do not find sufficient evidence

to conclude that it was intended to obtain thereafter to
subsequent layoff situations without an express mutual renewal.
Hence we do not find that it rose to the level of a continuing
condition of employment or statutory "status quo."

This is

not a disciplinary case involving a refusal to carry out a work
order.

Therefore the Union's instructions to employees not to

work overtime or on a sixth or seventh day did not violate the

- 2 -

"status quo."

Additionally we do not find that the contract

language unambiguously supports the Employer's position
regarding overtime and work on the sixth and seventh day under
the circumstances involved.

Accordingly, and again as this is

not a disciplinary case, the Union's instructions to its
members did not violate the contract.

That the employees laid

off may have been those who: the Employer claims were unnecessary
but forced on the Employer by the Union, is immaterial.
the Employer agreed to their employment

Once

they became employees

no different from any others under the contract, and as to
them the Employer enjoyed no immunity or exception from the
overtime and sixth and seventh day restrictions of the contract.
The Employer could have resisted and refused to employ them
subject to an adjudication of the rights of the parties under
the grievance and arbitration provisions of the contract, and/or
by other available legal action if the Union
retaliated.

unlawfully

Accordingly, the Employer's claims for damages

resulting from loss of business due to the Union's activities
are denied.
3.

The Employer's service to the airlines as an agent to

obtain and enter into contracts with various trucking companies
is not subcontracting within the meaning or prohibition of the
contract.

There is not sufficient evidence of a "diversion"

of bargaining unit work to non-bargaining unit employees or
truckers.

Therefore the Employer has not breached the

subcontracting provisions of the contract and the Union's claim
for damages is denied.

3 4.

Remaining claims, if any in this arbitration.by either

side against the other are dismissed as unproved, unmeritorious
or de minimus.

Dated:

July

1983

Eric J. Schrnertz, Chairman

Robert Glasser
Concurring in #1, 2, 3, 4
Dissenting from #1, 2, 3, 4

Alvin C. Schweizer
Concurring in #1, 2, 3, 4
Dissenting from #1, 2, 3, 4

Herbert A. Simon
Concurring in #1, 2, 3, 4
Dissenting from #1, 2, 3, 4

Robert S. Siano
Concurring in #1, 2, 3, 4
Dissenting from #1, 2, 3, 4
Dated: July 1983
State of New York
County of Nassau
I Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon ray oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my Award.

- 4 Dated:

July

1983

I Robert Glasser do hereby affirm upon my oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my Award.

Dated:

July

1983

I Alvin C. Schweizer do hereby affirm upon my oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my Award.

Dated:

July

1983

I Herbert A. Simon do hereby affirm upon my oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my Award.

Dated:

July

1983

I Robert S. Siano do hereby affirm upon my oath as
Arbitrator that I ana the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my Award.

SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
In the Matter of the Arbitration
Between
AIR CARGO INC. ("ACI")

AWARD

and
LOCAL 851, INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS
The Undersigned, duly designated as the System Board of
Adjustment and as the Arbitrators, and having duly heard the
proofs and allegations of the above-named parties make the
following AWARD:
1.

The long-standing practice of some drivers clocking

in and out, as directed, at American and United airlines, rather
than at the Employer's terminal, is a matter of "status quo."
Therefore the Employer's direction to continue that arrangement
was proper.

The Union's request for a cease and desist order

is denied.
2.

The Davidoff-Tidona agreement of July 2, 1982 to

permit overtime and work on the sixth and seventh day despite
layoffs appears to have been applicable to the specific
circumstances then present.

We do not find sufficient evidence

to conclude that it was intended to obtain thereafter to
subsequent layoff situations without an express mutual renewal.
Hence we do not find that it rose to the level of a continuing
condition of employment or statutory "status quo."

This is

not a disciplinary case involving a refusal to carry out a work
order.

Therefore the Union's instructions to employees not to

work overtime or on a sixth or seventh day did not violate the

- 2 -

"status quo."

Additionally we do not find that the contract

language unambiguously supports the Employer's position
regarding overtime and work on the sixth and seventh day under
the circumstances involved.

Accordingly, and again as this is

not a disciplinary case, the Union's instructions to its
members did not violate the contract.
off may have been those who?

That the employees laid

the Employer claims were unnecessary

but forced on the Employer by the Union, is immaterial.
the Employer agreed to their employment

Once

they became employees

no different from any others under the contract, and as to
them the Employer enjoyed no immunity or exception from the
overtime and sixth and seventh day restrictions of the contract.
The Employer could have resisted and refused to employ them
subject to an adjudication of the rights of the parties under
the grievance and arbitration provisions of the contract, and/or
by other available legal action if the Union unlawfully
retaliated.

Accordingly, the Employer's claims for damages

resulting from loss of business due to the Union's activities
are denied.
3.

The Employer's service to the airlines as an agent to

obtain and enter into contracts with various trucking companies
is not subcontracting within the meaning or prohibition of the
contract.

There is not sufficient evidence of a "diversion"

of bargaining unit work to non-bargaining unit employees or
truckers.

Therefore the Employer has not breached the

subcontracting provisions of the contract and the Union's claim
for damages is denied.

3 4.

Remaining claims, if any in this arbitration by either

side against the other are dismissed as unproved, unmeritorious
or de minimus.

Dated:

July C 1983

Eric J. SeTnmertz, Chairman
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Robert Glasser
ConcurrJ/ng in jfl, 2, -3, 4/'
Dissenting from #l,p,, 3,

•^Alvin "C. Schweizsr
Concurring in (£lj 2,
Dissenting from #l,((2

A
Herbert A. Simo
Concurring in #l,j5p 3 i
Dissenting from ^f 2 ,

Robert S. Siano
.,
Concurring in #1,(J> 3
Dissenting from %ffl 2 ,
Dated: July^ 1983
State of New York
County of Nassau
I Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which /irs my Award.

- 4 Dated:

.
July c 1983

I Robert Glasser do hereby affirm upon my oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my Award.

Dated:

July

1983

I Alvin C. Schweizer do hereby affirm upon my oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my Award.

Dated:

July

I Herbert A. Simon do hereby affirm upon my oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my Award.

Dated:

July £> 1983

I Robert S. Siano do hereby affirm upon my oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my Award.

f

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Federation of Telephone Workers
of Pennsylvania

AWARD
Case #14 30 0360 75

and
The Bell Telephone Company of
Pennsylvania

In full settlement of all claims and findings in the Awards
of Horlacher I, Horlacher II, Schmertz I and Schmertz II:
1.

The Union and the Company shall accept and
implement without the so-called "selfdestruct clause" the arrangement(s) referred
to in the record which were on the verge of
acceptance by the parties in settlement of
the substantive aspects of this case but
which aborted because of the said "selfdestruct clause0"

2.

In liquidation of all contract breaches, the
Company shall pay to the Union and to the
Union on behalf of bargaining unit employees
adversely affected by said breaches, the total
sum of two hundred eight-five thousand dollars
($285,000). Thereafter the Union shall make a
diligent and good faith effort to identify and
locate the employees adversely affected and
shall compensate them in appropriate amounts
from said sum.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

William E. Wallace
Concurring in (1),
(2) above
Dissenting from (1)
(2) above

DATED: May 12, 1983

Girard A. Voit
Concurring in (1),
(2) above
Dissenting from (1),
(2) above

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Federation of Telephone Workers
of Pennsylvania

AWARD
Case #14 30 0360 75

and
The Bell Telephone Company of
Pennsylvania

In full settlement of all claims and findings in the Awards
of Horlacher I, Horlacher II, Schmertz I and Schmertz II:
1.

2.

The Union and the Company shall accept and
implement without the so-called "selfdestruct clause" the arrangement(s) referred
to in the record which were on the verge of
acceptance by the parties in settlement of
the substantive aspects of this case but
which aborted because of the said "selfdestruct clause."
In liquidation of all contract breaches, the
Company shall pay to the Union and to the
Union on behalf of bargaining unit employees
adversely affecced by said breaches, the total
sum of two hundred eight-five thousand dollars
($285,000). Thereafter the Union shall make a
diligent and good faith effort to identify and
••• locate the employees adversely affected and
shall compensate them in appropriate amounts
from said sum.

Eric J. Schmertz
-Chairman

William E. Wallace
Concurring in (1),
(2) above
-^
Pi
_-:"=.-=,-_
iii.i-Ii_U,-IT r_ j.n i^-j OL_", -=-.-.-; '^<
^ _ _,

Girard A. Voit

DATED: May 12, 1983

—
f£-)- abovcDissenting from (1),
(2) above

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
U.A.W. Unity Lodge Local 405

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #12 30 0465 82

and
Chandler Evans, Inc.

At the hearing of the above matter on May 5, 1983 the
parties settled the dispute. At the request of the parties I
made the settlement my Award as follows:
Grievances 82C-206, 82C-208 and 82C218 are settled and withdrawn.
Under Article IV Section 6 of the contract, when a Union representative meets
with Management in a meeting called by
Management or mutually scheduled for the
handling of a problem that may lead to a
grievance, that Union representative is
entitled to a "pink ticket."
Pay for time spent under Article IV
Section 6 in the handling of grievances
shall include the actual time in meeting
with Management and time spent while on
the "pink ticket" in preparing and writing
up the grievance after such meeting.
Pay pursuant to Article IV Section 6 for
the time for the preparation and writing of
any grievance under that circumstance shall
be the actual time required but shall not
exceed twelve (12) minutes after the meeting with Management is concluded.
The Company shall not unreasonably withhold
pay for more than twelve (12) minutes if in
emergency cases additional time is legitimately required to prepare and write-up the

-2-

the grievance. The burden of proof
under this paragraph shall be on the
Union.
The Union waives all back pay claims
under these grievances.

Eric J. Schraertz
Arbitrator
DATED: May 11, 1983
STATE OF New Y o r k ) s s > .
COUNTY OF New York)
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon
my Oath as Arbitrator that I am the individual described
in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Unity Lodge Local 405

OPINION AND AWARD
Case No. 1230 0181 83

and
Chandler Evans, Inc.
The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the contract as
complained about in Grievance No. 82C 301? If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the Company offices on August 23,
1983 at which time representatives of the Union and Company
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
I sustain the Union's claim that the Company violated
Appendix G, Section J of the contract.

That Section sets forth

a bilaterally bargained procedure, sequence^method and pay scale
for the hiring, promotion and progression of employees classified
as Learner-Beginner and Learner-Advanced.

It leaves no room for

unilateral variations.
Hence, when the Company advanced an employee differently
or earlier than prescribed and placed him in a job classified as
"unclassified," it varied the bargained for arrangement.

I am

satisfied that the Company may not do so unilaterally in the face
of the clearly defined and specific steps prescribed by Section
5 of Appendix G.

There is no "unclassified" classification

therein, and there is no provision for an out-of-sequence
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"promotion" or advancement to that unprescribed classification
with an attendant change in the schedule of pay increases.
This is not to say that the Company may not create new
job classifications under Article X Section 4 of the contract.
Rather it is to say that consistent with the well settled rule
that the "specific pre-empts the general" the specific classifications set forth in Section J of Appendix G constitute full
and complete bargaining on the classifications applicable to
Learner-Beginners and Learner-Advanced, leaving no contractual
right as to those provisions and as to those existing jobs for
the unilateral establishment of new or different classifications
under Article X Section 4.
It is also well settled that an employer may not make a
unilateral change in a bilaterally agreed to contract provision
even if, as here, it is beneficial to the employee involved.
Accordingly, the Undersigned duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having been duly sworn, and having duly heard
the proofs and allegations of the above named parties, makes
the following AWARD:
The Company violated Appendix G, Section J
of the contract as complained about in
Grievance No. 82C-301. The grievance is
sustained in that respect. However, as the
affected employee suffered no monetary or
other damage, no monetary or other remedy
is awarded.

DATED: September 9, 1983
STATE OF New York).ecS,Q • .
COUNTY OF New York)

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 405 UAW
and

AWARD
Case #12 30 0321 83

Chandler Evans, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the disposition of the Union's
grievance No. 83c-41 dated February 15, 1983
on behalf of Brian Fearon?
A hearing was held on December 8, 1983 at the Company
offices at which time Mr. Fearon, hereinafter referred to as
the "grievant" or as 'ferian Fearon" and representatives of the
above named Union and Company appeared.

The Arbitrator's Oath

was duly administered.
During the course of the hearing the parties settled
the dispute to their mutual satisfaction and to the satisfaction
of Mr. Fearon.

At the request of the parties I make that

settlement my AWARD, as follows:
In settlement of grievance No0 83c-41, the
parties agree as follows on this date
December 8, 1983:
1. The Union withdraws its claim regarding
"red circle" rights in this case because it
acknowledges that the "red circle" provisions
of the contract don't apply to this grievance
or the facts in this case.
2. The Company acknowledges that the grievant
successfully bid on the job Set-Up Man Bostomatic and commenced work on that job on
July 5, 1983.
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3. The parties agree that as of the date
of the grievance (February 15, 1983) the
grievant Brian Fearon, should have been
at the grade 11 (eleven) pay rate. This
particular agreement (i.e. this para. 3)
is without precedent or prejudice.
4. The Union acknowledges that the layoff
of the grievant from that job on or about
May 30, 1983 was in accordance with the layoff provisions of the contract.
5. Based on the foregoing the grievant is
entitled to grade 11 (eleven) pay for the
period February 15, 1983 to the date of his
layoff, for regular time worked and for the
over-time he worked. The parties agree that
the amount involved is liquidated at $500.
which the Company will pay to the grievant.
This para. 5 agreement is without prejudice
and precedent.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: December 14, 1983
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) " " "
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath
as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and
who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 405 UAW
and

AWARD
Case #12 30 0321 83

Chandler Evans, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the disposition of the Union's
grievance No. 83c-41 dated February 15, 1983
on behalf of Brian Fearon?
A hearing was held on December 8, 1983 at the Company
offices at which time Mr. Fearon, hereinafter referred to as
the "grievant" or as "Brian Fearon" and representatives of the
above named Union and Company appeared.

The Arbitrator's Oath

was duly administered.
During the course of the hearing the parties settled
the dispute to their mutual satisfaction and to the satisfaction j
of Mr. Fearon.

At the request of the parties I make that

settlement my AWARD, as follows:
In settlement of grievance No. 83c-41, the
parties agree as follows on this date
December 8, 1983:
1. The Union withdraws its claim regarding
"red circle" rights in this case because it
acknowledges that the "red circle" provisions
of the contract don't apply to this grievance
or the facts in this case.
2. The Company acknowledges that the grievant
successfully bid on the job Set-Up Man Bostomatic and commenced work on that job on
July 5, 1983.

-23. The parties agree that as of the date
of the grievance (February 15, 1983) the
grievant Brian Fearon, should have been
at the grade 11 (eleven) pay rate. This
particular agreement (i.e. this para. 3)
is without precedent or prejudice.
4. The Union acknowledges that the layoff
of the grievant from that job on or about
May 30, 1983 was in accordance with the layoff provisions of the contract.
5. Based on the foregoing the grievant is
entitled to grade 11 (eleven) pay for the
period February 15, 1983 to the date of his
layoff, for regular time worked and for the
over-time he worked. The parties agree that
the amount involved is liquidated at $500.
which the Company will pay to the grievant.
This para. 5 agreement is without prejudice
and precedent.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: December 14, 1983
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath
as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and
who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

,-••!•

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 1400, IBEW

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #52 30 0002 82

and
Citizens Gas & Coke Utility,
Indianapolis, Indiana

The stipulated issue is:
"Whether the Utility violated the collective
bargaining agreement in discharging the
grievant? If so, what remedy is appropriate?"
- A hearing was held in Indianapolis, Indiana on November
17, 1982 at which time Robert Fields III, hereinafter referred
to as the "grievant," and representatives of the above named
Union and Utility appeared.

All concerned were offered full

opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The grievant was employed by the Utility at the Prospect
Plant since August, 1979. At the time of the incident in question,
he had attained the job classification of Crusherman and was engaged in part of the process by which the Utility manufactured
coke from coal.

That process consists of cooking blends of

various coals, and, depending on the particular blend so cooked,
results in the production of two different kinds of coke: (1)
foundry coke, which is used by cast iron manufacturers and is the
more profitable coke by approximately $50.00 per ton and (2) blast
furnance coke which is used by steel manufacturers.

As a Crusher-

man, the grievant was responsible for insuring: (1) that a proper
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1
blend of coals was sent from a number of bins

on the coal mix-

ing floor to the crusher; and, (2) that the appropriate

"crushed"

coal blend was thereafter sent to the correct coal bunker.

The

coal blend for foundry coke was to be sent to the bunker for the
E & H oven battery.

The blend for blast furnace coke was to be

sent to the bunker for the Number One oven battery.
On August 18, 1981, the grievant was terminated by the
Utility for an alleged continuing pattern of negligent work
habits.

Within the six months preceeding his discharge, the

grievant has received a verbal warning for failing to report a
belt malfunction, a written warning for sending the wrong coal
blend to the Number One battery, and a three day suspension for
sleeping on the job.

The incident which triggered the grievant's

discharge occurred on August 7, 1981.

On that date, as the Union

concedes, an improper blend of coal was sent to the ovens on the
E & H batteries.

As a result, at least twenty-one of those ovens

produced over 200 tons of blast furnace rather than foundry coke,
thus causing the Utility to lose over $10,000 in profit.

After

an investigation, the Utility concluded that the grievant was
responsible for sending the incorrect coal blend and discharged
him.

1. There are six bins on the mixing floor. Four bins
contain coals of varying volatility. One bin contains "coarse
breese" which consists of small pieces of coke and is reused to
make new coke after it is crushed into "fine breese" by the rod
mill. One bin is used to store the "fine breese."

-3This case turns solely on the question of whether the
Utility has met its burden of establishing the grievant's fault
by clear, persuasive and convincing evidence. While the Union
contends that the Utility has not satisfied its burden of proving that the grievant was responsible for running the wrong coal
blend! on August 7, 1981, it does not argue that the penalty of

I
discharge would be improper or inappropriate if culpability for
2
the final mistake is found. A careful and thorough review of
the extensive testimony and exhibits submitted in this proceeding has persuaded me that the Utility has satisfied its burden of
proof.
The Utility has proven through its witnesses and documentary evidence that blast furnace, rather than foundry coke was

3
"pushed" out of at least twenty-one ovens on the E & H batteries
beginning at 4:48 AM and continuing through 11:02 AM on August
9, 1981.

The uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony of Jerry

Liford, the Superintendent of Coal and Coke Handling, John Stuck,
Shift Coal and Coke Foreman, and Harry Knight, Superintendent of
E & H batteries, has established that at least that number of ovens
produced the wrong coke during the period from a little before

2. During earlier steps in the grievance process, the Union
contended that the Utility violated Article III, Section B (2) of
the Work Rules by its failure to notify the grievant of his discharge until August 18, 1981, which the Union argued was more than
"five working days (after) the Utility's establishing proof of the
offense." However, this time limit on its face applies to suspensions and not discharges. Even if applicable, it was complied
with by the Utility since the undisputed evidence demonstrates
that the Utility's investigation was not completed until August
17, 1981. In any event, the Union has not pressed this contention
in its post-hearing brief.
3. The first few ovens produced a mixture of the two cokes
and the remainder produced "pure" blast furnace coke.

-4-

5: AM to about 11:00 AM on August 9.

Mr. Stuck and Mr. Knight

each observed the coke as it was removed from the ovens and each
testified that blast furnace and foundry coke are visually distin-

4
guishable.

The entries in the Foreman's Log for August 9 sub-

stantiates the fact that the last four ovens pushed on C shift,
(whose workday ends at 7:00 AM) and the first eighteen ovens
pushed on A shift, (whose workday begins at 7:00 AM) produced
5
blast furnace coke.
The Utility has established the precise
identity of the ovens which produced the wrong coke and the precise
time each such oven was pushed by the testimony of its witnesses
and the Pushing Schedule for the time period in question.
The Pushing Schedule further established that the first of
the ovens which produced or pushed the wrong coke was charged
with improper coal blend from the E & H bunker at 11:34 PM on
August 7, 1981.

Thus, the improper blend of coals must have been

sent to the E & H bunker prior to that time and in a quantity in
excess of 150 tons since the uncontradicted evidence indicates
that no less an amount could have produced twenty-one ovens of
improper coke.

Although a Crusherman worked on each of three

4. Blast furnace coke is in large block-like pieces;
foundry coke is long and splintery in configuration.
5. The Union contends that none of the enti/es in the
Foreman's Log is credible because the Utility has conceded the
incorrectness of one entry which purports to indicated that the
ovens on the E & H batteries ran out of coal on August 7, 1981.
However, this Arbitrator believes that one error which is explainable as an isolated and independent occurrence does not destroy
the credibility of the entire document. This is especially so in
this case since the Log entries with respect to the production of
blast furnace coke are corroborated by the testimony of the
Utility's witnesses.
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shifts on August 7, 1981, and another, other than the grievant,
worked on the last shift on August 6, the documentary evidence,
if believed, establishes that the wrong coal blend must have been
sent to the E & H Bunker by the grievant during the B shift.
The Coal Handling Operation Sheet for August 7 indicates
that the anthracite clock reflected that the A shift Crusherman
ran only five minutes of coal to the E & H Bunker.

Since a

Crusherman can only run about 2.5 tons a minute, this document
leads to the conclusion that the error did not occur during the
A shift.

In addition, the same document indicates that the C

shift did not begin to run any coal to the E & H Bunker until
after the Crusherman on that shift ran two hours and forty minutes
to the Number One Battery Bunker.

Since the C shift began work

at 11:00 PM on August 7, that Crusherman could not have run any
coal to the E & H Battery until after 11:34 PM which is the time
when the first oven was charged with the improper blend of coal.
Lastly, the document, and Mr. Liford's testimony, indicates that
the wrong blend could not have been sent prior to the beginning
of the A shift (i.e. 7:00 AM) on August 7, because between 7:00 AM
and 11:34 PM, the amount of coal extracted from the E & H Bunker
exceeded by at least 37.5 tons the total capacity of the Bunker
(450 tons).

Thus, any coal sent to the Bunker before 7:00 AM on

August 7 would have been used before the first oven was charged
with the wrong blend of coal.

Since the grievant was the only

Crusherman who sent enough coal (262.5 tons) to produce the wrong
coke in twenty-one ovens before 11:34 PM on August 7 but late
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enough so that it would be used to charge an oven at that time,
the evidence points strongly to the conclusion that the grievant
sent an improper blend of coal to the E & H Bunker.
The Union, however, has advanced several

alternative

possibilities which would attribute the error to persons other
than the grievant.

First, Keven L. Napper, the Rod Mill Operator

who worked alongside of the grievant on August 7, hypothesized
that the Crusherman on the A shift was responsible for sending th
wrong coal blend.

That theory requires this Arbitrator to con-

clude, on the basis of speculation, that it was reasonably possible
that the Crusherman intentionally lied when noting on the Coal
Handling Operation Sheet that he ran only five minutes of coal
to the E & H Bunker; that he tampered with and set-back the
anthracite clock to conceal the actual time he did run to the
Bunker; that he also tampered with and reset the oil clock so
that it would not reflect the actual run; and that the shortage
of coal which would have resulted had a long run been concealed
6
would not have been discovered or reported.
Another witness for the Union, Jerry L. Whittaker, Chief
Steward, hypothesized that the improper coal was sent during the
C shift, which worked from 11:00 PM on August 7 to 7:00 AM on
August 8th.

Mr. Whittaker's theory is premised on the assumption

that the E & H Bunker was empty at 11:46 PM on August 7.

If that

6. The Utility also argues that the A shift Crusherman could
not have been responsible for the error because if a run of the
length necessary to contaminate 21 ovens had occurred on the A
shift, the E & H Bunker would have been too full to accommodate
the coal which the grievant admits he sent during the B shift.
The Utility's argument is, however, premised on the accuracy of
the grievant"s own testimony, given almost two years after the
event, that he completed his runs to the E & H Bunker before rather
than after the lunch break he took at 7:00 PM on the day in
question.
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was so, Mr. Whittaker speculated that any improper coal produced
therafter must have been sent to the Bunker after the grievant's
shift had ended.

This theory depends upon the accuracy of a

notation in the Foreman's Log which purports to reflect that on
August 7 the E & H Bunker was "out of coal for a short time" and
an inference from the Pushing Schedule which indicates that no
ovens were pushed between 11:46 PM on August 7 and 1:55 AM on
August 8.

On the other hand, Mr. Liford testified that the

notation in the Foreman's Log that the Bunker was "out of coal"
was incorrect.

He stated that the battery crew mistakenly sur-

mised that the Bunker was empty when, in fact, the coal was stuck
in the system due to a malfunction.

He further stated that the

ovens could not be pushed between 11:46 PM and 1:55 AM because
of an earlier breakdown in the door of some of the equipment.
More Importantly, the Utility contends that the undisputed
evidence relating to the amount of coal sent to and removed from
the E & H Bunker demonstrates that it was impossible for that
Bunker to be empty at 11:46 PM on August 7.

Thus, the Bunker

contained 450 tons at the start of the A shift on August 7 and
during that shift 12.5 additional tons were sent and 250 tons
were removed.

Accordingly, the Bunker contained 212.5 tons at

the beginning of the B shift.

The grievant then sent 262.5 tons

to the Bunker during his shift and 237.5 tons were removed.
Accordingly, at 11:00 PM, which was the beginning of the C shift,
the Bunker held at least 237.5 tons.

Since only 25 tons were

removed from the Bunker between 11:00 PM and 11:46

PM it could
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not have been empty at the latter time.

Lastly, as previously

discussed, the first oven was charged with the improper coal blenc
at 11:34 PM and the first run to the E & H Battery by the C shift
would not have occurred until after that time.
The Union also contends that the grievant was not responsible
for the error, even if he sent the improper blend to the E & H
Bunker.

Rather, it phypthesizes that the Coal Handling Operator

put the wrong kind of coals in the various binds on the mixing
floor.

Thus, it argues that blast furnace coke was produced even

though the grievant properly set up his equipment to run a blend
which should have produced only foundry coke.

This theory is,

however, inconsistent with the uncontradicted and unimpeached
testimony of Mr. Stuck and Mr. Knight, both of whom actually
observed the coal that was produced from the ovens.

They testi-

fied that any coal which would have been produced as a result of
such an error by the Coal Handling Operator would have been substantially different in appearance from blast furnace coke since
the former would still have contained breese from the fifth bin
on the mixing floor.

Indeed, even Mr. Napper essentially admitted

that to be the case.

And both Utility witnesses testified that

the coke that they observed as it was removed from the ovens was
"pure" blast furnace coke.
The Union further contends that the testimony of the
grievant and Mr. Napper, his co-worker, establishes that the
grievant was not responsible for the error.

The grievant testi-

fied that he properly ran his equipment so that the coal blend
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he sent to the E & H Bunker should have produced foundry coke.
Mr. Napper testified that he was working in the same location as
the grievant on August 7, that he assisted the grievant in setting
up the equipment, and that, based upon his personal observation,
the grievant properly performed his functions during his runs to
the E & H Bunker.
If the only evidence submitted in this proceeding was that
thus far discussed, I might very well have concluded that the
Utility failed to satisfy its burden of proof, despite the strong
circumstantial evidence pointing to the grievant's fault.

How-

ever, it has alsobeen established that during the earlier stages
of this grievancw the grievant admitted that he sent the wrong
coal blend to the E & H Bunker.

His own Union representative

testified that the grievance consistently maintained and stated,
until after the third-step hearing, that he sent a blend which
would have produced blast furnace coke.

At that time, the griev-

ant maintained that he did so on the instructions of his supervisor.

The grievant did not contend that he ran his equipment

in a proper manner to produce foundry coke until after Mr. Napper
so testified at the third-step hearing.

Indeed, the Union repre-

sentative admitted that Mr. Napper's testimony came as a surprise
to the Union.

Although the grievant denies he stated at the

third-step hearing that he sent the wrong blend, and although he
no longer presses the contention that he was instructed to do so
by his supervisor, I find his prior position, which he asserted
immediately after the incident when all of the facts were fresh
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in his mind, constitutes an admission of fault.

In light of this

admission, and the strong circumstantial evidence introduced by
the Utility, the testimony of the grievant and Mr. Napper cannot
be considered credible or persuasive.

Accordingly, I conclude

that the Utility has established by clear, convincing and
persuasive evidence that the grievant improperly sent the wrong
coal blend to the E & H Bunker on August 7, 1981 and thereby
caused a substantial loss to the Utility.
For the foregoing reasons, the grievance is denied.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The Utility did not violate the collective
bargaining agreement in discharging Robert
Fields, III.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: April 24, 1983
STATE OF New York)ss .
COUNTY OF New York)
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 3, Newspaper Guild of New
York, AFL-CIO

OPINION
and
AWARD
Case #1330 0236 81

and
Consumers Union of United States, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Under Article V Section 10 was the job content
of the regular job of the Survey Research Associate so changed during the term of the 1979-80
CBA as to bring it within a higher classification?
If so what shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held on November 6, 1981, June 30 and November
8, 1982 at which time representatives of the Guild, hereinafter
referred to as the "Union" and Consumers Union, hereinafter referred
to as the "Employer" appeared.

All concerned were afforded full

opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.
The thrust of the Union's case is that during the period of
1979-80 Survey Research Associates were required to assume and
perform new and regular duties in connection with the use of
computers, and that by consequence, the duties, responsibilities,
skills and complexity of the job were so increased and changed
as to warrant an upgrading of the job to the group 7T level, retrojactive to May

1980.

Based on the record I conclude, the Union's proofs notwithstanding, that this particular subject matter and issue was
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resolved by direct negotiations between the parties in the 1979
contract negotiations.
The Employer has presented persuasive and essentially unrebutted evidence that in those contract negotiations the Union
agreed to include computer work and/or increased computer work
as part of the job classification without an increase in the job
level or pay, in exchange for a dental plan for the bargaining
unit.
The contract Memorandum of Settlement supports that conclusion.

The relevant part of Paragraph 6 thereof reads:
"
Add the language in the attached proposals
of March 9, 1979 for job classifications 2T,
4T, 5, 6T and 7T (Ex.C) will be added to the
job descriptions in those classifications.
Similar language will be added to all other
job descriptions in Groups 2 through 8. The
Guild agrees to withdraw and not to reinstate
all outstanding computerization-related arbitration and grievances."

The language referred to therein as Ex.C reads:
2T

-

May perform routine operations on a
computer and computer-related equipment as directed by project leader.

4T

-

May enter programs, do computations and
perform other more relatively complex
operations on a computer or computerrelated equipment than a Group 2T.

5

-

May perform simple or routine operations
on computer or computer-related equipment.

6T

-

May write cimple computer programs, modify
or code more complex programs and trouble
shoot computers and computer-related
equipment.

7T

-

May write complex computer programs and
may design and construct interfaces between
computers and other equipment.
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I am satisfied that the applicable foregoing language,
added to the Survey Research Associate classification, which
was then and now slotted at Group 7, accurately and adequately
describes the computer work which the Union cites and relies
on in this case in an effort to gain an upgrading of the job.
As the Memorandum of Settlement expressly states that
"The Guild agrees to withdraw and not reinstate
all outstanding computerization-related arbitrations and grievances" (emphasis added)
I can only conclude that during the negotiations both sides fully
contemplated the fact and consequences of adding computer duty
language to the job description and the Union waived any right
to grieve or arbitrate both the addition of the duties and its
effect.

Hence the Union's instant grievance and arbitration case

appear to me to be an effort to obtain by arbitration what the
Union agreed to relinquish in negotiations.

I am complelled to

so find irrespective of the Union's case which, on the merits,
does show a significant increase in computer work required of
Survey Research Associates during the relevant period.
As the Employer asserts, the probative quid pro quo for
the uncontestable agreement to add and increase computer duties
to the job, was the dental plan.

The position of the dental plan

agreement in the Memorandum, together with the Employer's unrefuted evidence on this point, are conclusive.

The dental plan

benefit is paragraph 5 in the Memorandum immediately preceeding
the paragraph dealing with the addition of computer duties to
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the Survey Research Associate job and other classifications.

I

think it logical and reasonable to conclude, as the Employer
contends, that paragraphs 5 and 6 were "considerations" for each
other.
Accordingly, the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator, having been duly sworn and having duly heard the
proofs and allegations of the above named parties, makes the
following AWARD:
The Union's grievance that under Article V
Section 10 of the contract, the job content
of the regular job of the Survey Research
Associate so changed during the term of the
1979-80 collective bargaining agreement as
to bring it within a higher classification,
is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: February 14, 1983
STATE OF New York )ss.:
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD„

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Fairfield Employees' Association
AWARD
and
E. I. DuPont deNemours and Company
Fairfield, Connecticut Plant

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Board of
Arbitration, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties make

the following AWARD:

The Company violated Article II Section
4 of the collective bargaining agreement
and the separate agreement dated September
1, 1978 when it contracted out janitorial
work on Saturdays when 14 or more wage roll
employees were scheduled to work that day.
The Company is directed to cease and desist
from subcontracting the janitorial work under
these circumstances. The janitorial employee(s)
who would have been scheduled to work on the
Saturdays involved but who did not work because
of the subcontracting, shall be made whole for
the time lost.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

David H. Kiley
Concurring

Peter D. Walther
Dissenting
DATED: October 17, 1983
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: October
STATE OF

COUNTY OF

1983
)__
.
9O • •

)

I, David H. Kiley do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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DATED: October
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1983
)
)"

I, Peter D. Walther do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Fairfield Employees' Association
OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
and
E. I. DuPont deNemours and Company
Fairfield, Connecticut Plant

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the contracting out of janitorial
work on Saturdays, when 14 or more wage
roll employees are schedulued to work that
day violates Article II Section 4, Articles
IX and X of the collective bargaining agreement, the separate agreement dated September
1, 1978 respecting the scheduling of janitors
on Saturdays or the past practice between
Management and the Union in this regard.
A hearing was held in Fairfield, Connecticut on June 2,
1983 at which time representatives of the above named Company
and Union appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses
The Undersigned served as Chairman of the Board of Arbitration
and Messrs. Peter D. Walther and David H. Kiley served respectively as the Company and Union designees to said Board.
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The

A stenographic record was taken

and the parties filed post-hearing briefs.
I consider pertinent to this proceeding Article II Section
4 of the collective bargaining agreement and the separate agreement dated September 1, 1978.
Article II Section 4 reads:
This Agreement constitutes the entire Agreement between the parties hereto as of the execution date hereof. However, any supplement

-2which may hereafter be mutually agreed upon
between the parties, when executed in the
same manner as this Agreement, shall become
and be a part of this Agreement.
The separate agreement dated September 1, 1978 reads:
In response to the Union's request for clarification of the basis upon which Change House
Janitors will be scheduled on Saturdays, the
following will serve as a guide point:
If 14 or more wage roll people are schedsaheduled on the day shift, then a Change
House Janitor will be scheduled.
I conclude that the separate agreement dated September 1,
1978 and the Labor Contract Note clarifying that agreement are
enforceable as a "supplement" to the collective bargaining
agreement within the meaning of Article II Section 4 of the
contract and are applicable under the circumstances of this case
In form, the separate agreement or Labor Contract Note
substantially comply with the aforementioned contract condition.
Either or both are in writing and initialed by an authorized
representative of the Company.

As such, as a matter of law,

that substantially though not precisely meets the requirement
of an agreement "executed in the same manner" as the collective
1
bargaining agreement. But if there be any deficiencies between
substantial and specific compliance with the aforesaid requirements, they are cured, in my view, by the manner in which the
parties have agreed to, dealt with, operated under and changed
Labor Contract Notes.

1. Indeed, under traditional contract law it would enforceable
against the Company as an agreement in writing "signed by
the party to be charged."
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The evidence shows that the separate agreement and Notes
were bilaterally bargained; that except in this case each has
been unconditionally followed; that the instant Note was in
fact uniformly followed for an extended period of time until
unilaterally changed by the Company giving rise to this case;
that as a practice, changes in Notes have been bilaterally
bargained; and that in the instant case the Company tried to
bargain a change in the agreement and Note dealing with the
call-in of a janitor on Saturdays, before unilaterally subcontracting that janitorial work.
All this adds up in my mind to a mutual recognition and
practice that accords to the Note (as the bilaterally agreed
to clarification of the separate agreement), contractual and
enforceable characteristics within the meaning, inten^

and

purpose of the reference to supplemental agreements in Article
II Section 4 of the contract.
I reject the Company's argument that because circumstances
changed when the 12 hour shift was instituted, thereby changing
Saturday work from overtime to straight time, the Note and the
practice thereunder were no longer applicable.
The fact as I see it is that the janitorial service was
made available on Saturdays not because employees worked overtime, but because 14 or more employees were at work on that day,
and janitorial services were needed for cleanliness purposes.
That remained true with the installation of the 12 hour shift
of 14 or more straight time employees.

Indeed, I am persuaded

-4that the Company shifted to a private contractor for economic
reasons, not because of a change in the work week. That being
so, the work week change was not the type of changed conditions
which would support a variation in an established practice or
which would make the Note or the separate agreement obsolete?
or inapplicable.
For the foregoing reasons, I also reject the Company's
assertion that the separate agreement and/or Note were merely
"guidelines."

The language uses the words "guide point" not

"guideline." In my view "guide point" sets forth the parameters
or "point" under or at which the provision would come into play,
and the procedure for its implementation.

The phrase "guide

point" does not give the Company the unilateral right to disregard or change the basic intent and import of the arrangement.

DATED: October 17, 1983

Eric J. Schtnertz
Chairman

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Fairfield Employees' Association
AWARD
and

E. I. DuPont deNemours and Company
Fairfield, Connecticut Plant

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Board of
Arbitration, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties make

the following AWARD:

The Company violated Article II Section
4 of the collective bargaining agreement
and the separate agreement dated September
1, 1978 when it contracted out janitorial
work on Saturdays when 14 or more wage roll
employees were scheduled to work that day.
The Company is directed to cease and desist
from subcontracting the janitorial work under
these circumstances. The janitorial employee(s)
who would have been scheduled to work on the
Saturdays involved but who did not work because
of the subcontracting, shall be made whole for
the time lost.

Eric/j. Schmertz
Chaifrman

David H. Kile
Concurring

Peter D. Walther
Dissenting
DATED: October 17, 1983
STATE OF New York )(ss
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARI

DATED: October
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1983
ss.

I, David H. Kiley do hereby a f f i r m upon my Oath as
A r b i t r a t o r that I am the individual describe^ inland who
Jd
executed this instrument, which is my AWA
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DATED: October
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1983
ss .

I, Peter D. Walther do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Fairfield Employees' Association
OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
and
E. I. DuPont deNemours and Company
Fairfield, Connecticut Plant

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the contracting out of janitorial
work on Saturdays, when 14 or more wage
roll employees are schedulued to work that
day violates Article II Section 4, Articles
IX and X of the collective bargaining agreement, the separate agreement dated September
1, 1978 respecting the scheduling of janitors
on Saturdays or the past practice between
Management and the Union in this regard.
A hearing was held in Fairfield, Connecticut on June 2,
1983 at which time representatives of the above named Company
and Union appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Undersigned served as Chairman of the Board of Arbitration
and Messrs. Peter D. Walther and David H. Kiley served respectively as the Company and Union designees to said Board.
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The

A stenographic record was taken

and the parties filed post-hearing briefs.
I consider pertinent to this proceeding Article II Section
4 of the collective bargaining agreement and the separate agreei
ment dated September 1, 1978.
Article II Section 4 reads:
This Agreement constitutes the entire Agreement between the parties hereto as of the execution date hereof. However, any supplement

-2which may hereafter be mutually agreed upon
between the parties, when executed in the
same manner as this Agreement, shall become
and be a part of this Agreement.
The separate agreement dated September 1, 1978 reads:
In response to the Union's request for clarification of the basis upon which Change House
Janitors will be scheduled on Saturdays, the
following will serve as a guide point:
If 14 or more wage roll people are sched. .scheduled on the day shift, then a Change
House Janitor will be scheduled.
I conclude that the separate agreement dated September 1,
1978 and the Labor Contract Note clarifying that agreement are
enforceable as a "supplement" to the collective bargaining
agreement within the meaning of Article II Section 4 of the
j

contract and are applicable under the circumstances of this case,
In form, the separate agreement or Labor Contract Note

|
i
substantially comply with the aforementioned contract condition.I
Either or both are in writing and initialed by an authorized
representative of the Company.

As such, as a matter of law,

that substantially though not precisely meets the requirement
of an agreement "executed in the same manner" as the collective
1
bargaining agreement. But if there be any deficiencies between
substantial and specific compliance with the aforesaid requirements, they are cured, in my view, by the manner in which the
parties have agreed to, dealt with, operated under and changed
Labor Contract Notes.

1. Indeed, under traditional contract law it would enforceable
against the Company as an agreement in writing "signed by
the party to be charged."

-3The evidence shows that the separate agreement and Notes
were bilaterally bargained; that except in this case each has
been unconditionally followed; that the instant Note was in
fact uniformly followed for an extended period of time until
unilaterally changed by the Company giving rise to this case;
that as a practice, changes in Notes have been bilaterally
bargained; and that in the instant case the Company tried to
bargain a change in the agreement and Note dealing with the
call-in of a janitor on Saturdays, before unilaterally subcontracting that janitorial work.
All this adds up in my mind to a mutual recognition and
practice that accords to the Note (as the bilaterally agreed
to clarification of the separate agreement), contractual and
enforceable characteristics within the meaning, inten*'

and

purpose of the reference to supplemental agreements in Article
II Section 4 of the contract.
I reject the Company's argument that because circumstances
changed when the 12 hour shift was instituted, thereby changing
Saturday work from overtime to straight time, the Note and the
practice thereunder were no longer applicable.
The fact as I see it is that the janitorial service was
made available on Saturdays not because employees worked overtime, but because 14 or more employees were at work on that day,
and janitorial services were needed for cleanliness purposes.
That remained true with the installation of the 12 hour shift
of 14 or more straight time employees.

Indeed, I am persuaded

-4that the Company shifted to a private contractor for economic
reasons, not because of a change in the work week. That being
so, the work week change was not the type of changed conditions
which would support a variation in an established practice or
which would make the Note or the separate agreement obsolete,
or inapplicable.
For the foregoing reasons, I also reject the Company's
assertion that the separate agreement and/or Note were merely
"guidelines."

The language uses the words "guide point" not

"guideline." In my view "guide point" sets forth the parameters
or "point" under or at which the provision would come into play,
and the procedure for its implementation.

The phrase "guide

point" does not give the Company the unilateral right to disregard, or change the basic intent and import of the arrangement.

DATED: October 17, 1983

Eric «J. Schmertz
Chairman

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION
Marine Draftsmen's Association
Port of New London
and

AND

AWARD

MDA 80-93 (Union No.)
MDA Grievance #42-80
(Employer No.)

Electric Boat Division,
General Dynamics Corporation

In accordance with Article VI of the collective bargaining
agreement dated June 9, 1980 between the above-named Union and
Employer, the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to
hear and decide the following issue as formulated in the Union's
grievance dated December 22, 1980 and the Employer's answer dated
January 20, 1981:
The MDA grieves the Company's bringing in
"job shop" personnel to perform MDA bargaining unit work on the employer's premises.
Grievance denied, no violation of contract.
The Company reserves its right to raise any
other defense to this grievance at any other
time.
Hearings were held in Mystic, Connecticut on March 9, March
10, April 28, April 29, May 5 and May 6, 1981 and in Groton,
Connecticut on May 22, July 27, July 28, July 29, September 11,
September 21, September 25, October 2 and November 16, 1981, at
which times representatives of the Union and Employer (hereinafter
referred to also as the Company and the MDA respectively) appeared
and were afforded a full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Oath was waived.

A stenographic record was taken.

The Arbitrator's
The parties

waived the time limit for the rendition of the Arbitrator's Award,
The parties filed post-hearing briefs by June 15, 1982 and reply

-2briefs by August 2, 1982.

BACKGROUND
The Union was certified in 1945 and represents approximately 2000 design-drafting employees and technical-clerical employees
The collective bargaining agreement between the parties dated
October 1, 1976 was effective from that date until September 30,
1979.

As of October 1, 1979, when the parties had failed to

negotiate a successor agreement and the Union commenced a strike.
The parties entered into a Strike Settlement Agreement dated May
23, 1980 (Joint Exhibit 3) and executed a new collective bargaining agreement on June 9, 1980.

The Strike Settlement Agreement

provided for the recall of striking employees over the period
from June 16 to August 18, 1980.

Several months after the recall,

the Employer engaged contractor personnel (hereafter referred to
as "job shoppers") who performed various work at the Groton shipyard that members of the bargaining unit had normally performed.
As a result, the Union filed the instant grievance.

-3PERTINENT CONTRACT LANGUAGE

The following provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement are pertinent1^ „-_
ARTICLE I
RECOGNITION
The Employer recognises the Union as the certified representative o'LemployeeS) in technical and
clerical classifications working in Engineering and
Engineering support functions who are employed in
the Employer's facilities in Connecticut .and any
other location as hereinafter may be added to the
foregoing by mutual agreement of the parties, but
excluding:
A. 'Employpes -represented by the Metal Trades
Cnunci' of New London County (AFL-CIO).
B. Employees represented by the Patternmaker's
C. ^Employees who are employed in any of the

iollowirig sections, functions or departments of
the Company wherever they may exist:
The offices of the General Manager,. Staff
Managers including: Deputy General
Manager, Assistant General Managers,
Directors and Program Managers; Community Relations; Public Relations; Legal;
Industrial Relations; and Security;
D. The Secretary who reports to the following
Department Heads:
1. Marketing and Long Range Planning
Department.
2. Proposal Development and Preparation
Department.
3. Contracts Department.
4. The Budgets, Financial Analysis, and
Estimating functions of the Comptroller's
office.
5. Systems and Procedures Department.
6. Change Control Department.
E. All salaried and supervisory employees.
ARTICLE II
i

NON-BARGAINING UNIT EMPLOYEES

1

_ Non-bargaining unit employees shall not perform work normally periormea by bargaining unit
employees except as required to properly instruct
bargaining unit employees.
This article shall not be construed to restrict or
require modification to current practices.
The Employer shall maintain a system to review
all requisitions for salaried positions and shall periodically review job functions performed by salaried
non-supervisory personnel on an on-going basis to
ensure that the work performed is in fact not bargaining unit work.

ARTICLE III
t

UNION SECURITY

SECTION 1. Any employee on the Employer's
active payroll who is in the bargaining unit on June
9, 1980, and employees hired, recalled, or transferred into the bargaining unit subsequent to this
date shall be required, as a condition of employment, by the thirty-first day of employment, recall
or transfer, to join (unless already a member) and
maintain membership in the Marine Draftsmen's
Union.
This section shall be effective only when in compliance with applicable State and Federal law and
to the extent permitted thereby.
SECTION 2..The Employer will deduct Union
dues, initiation fees, or reinstatement fees once each _
month from the wages of each employee who consents to such deductions on a properly executed
authorization card.
ARTICLE V
MANAGEMENT RIGHTS
In the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of this Agreement, the
'Employer shall not be deemed to have been restricted in any way in the exercise of the regular and
customary functions of management except as specifically limited in the provisions of this Agreement,

ARTICLE VI
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

Step 3.

If, within three (3) working days after
presenting the grievance in Step 2
h e r e o f , it is not s a t i s f a c t o r i l y
adjusted, it shall be referred to the
Labor Relations Section of the
I n d u s t r i a l Relations Department.
The grievance shall then be heard by
a Grievance Committee consisting of

not men lino four (4) wm&

lives of the Union and not more than
an equal number of representatives
of the Employer exclusive of witnesses in an attempt to reach a satisfactory resolution of the issue.
(Toward that end, the parties agree to
disclose their positions in detail and
upon request, to exchange information regarding the evidence upon
which they intend to rely in arbitration if the matter remains unresolved.
Any a d d i t i o n a l evidence not disclosed at this meeting may not be
utilized at the arbitration hearing
unless the p a r t y (parties) was
genuinely unaware of the evidence at
the Step 3 meeting. The party who
finds such additional evidence agrees
to notify the other party of such findings so that an additional effort may
be made to resolve the issue prior to
arbitration, or if found during arbitration, agrees to notify the other
party of such evidence before it is
presented in testimony).
Step 4.

If the grievance is not adjusted by the
parties within one (1) week, it may be
submitted by either party to
arbitration.
The arbitrator shall have no power to
alter, amend, change, add to, or subtract from any of the terms of this
Agreement, or its written supplements, but he shall determine only
whether or not there has been a violation of this Agreement in the respect
alleged in the grievance and if so, he
shall formulate a remedy therefore.
The decision and award of the arbitrator shall be final and binding on
both parties. The fees and expenses
of the arbitrator shall be shared
equally by the parties.

SECTION 10. In the event of a lack 01 wo.« _r
excess of work situation, the Employer may loan
jmployees from one work category to another for
the same or different functional categories, or from
one work shift to another for a period not to exceed
six (6) months within a twelve (12) month period.
The Employer shall notify the Union reasonabh
in advance when any transfer and /or loan o

Any employee who is on loan for a period o.
twelve (12) months shall be transferred to the position to which he has been loaned unless the
Employer and the Union agree to continue the loan
status of the employee on a case basis.
Requests for extensions to loan periods shall be
handled on a case basis by mutual consent, except
that in the case where lack of work does not exist in
the loaning group, extensions shall be granted in
increments of additional thirty (30) calendar days.
ARTICLE XXVI
TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES
SECTION 1. Summer employees are not eligible for fringe benefits such as Personal Time and
Vacations. Group Insurance will be available.
SECTION 2. All summer employees will be
considered temporary for a period of ninety (90)
days and will receive no seniority rights during this
period.
SECTION 3. There will be no layoffs for lack of
work in a work category while summer employees
continue to be employed therein.
SECTION 4. The Employer has the right to
maintain the Engineering Co-op Student Program.
t is expressly understood and agreed that Engineerng Co-op Students will not be assigned to work in
;ny functional category in which a reduction in
orce due to lack of work is in effect.
SECTION 5 The title "Technical Trainee" for
urnmer employees has been eliminated. In accorlance with past practice, Engineering Trainees and
scientist Trainees will not be required to join the
Inion and will not perform bargaining unit work,
summer employees performing bargaining unit"
vork shall join the MDA.
ARTICLE XXXI
SUBCONTRACTING

ARTICLE X
WAGE RATES
SECTION 1. WAGES. It is mutually understood and agreed that wages shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this article and the
classification structure herein.

The Employer agrees not to subcontract wor!
normally performed by employees u n d e r thi
Agreement, when proper facilities and employee
are available, in order to deprive employees o
continuing work. Any work shifted to the Quinc;
Yard will be considered to be subcontracting.

The Employer agrees to discuss such work tha
would normally be performed by the Marine
Draftsmen's Union prior to letting such contracts.

-5CONTENTIONS OF THE UNION
The Union set forth the following arguments in support of
its position:
1. The job shoppers were employees of the
Employer and subject to the collective bargaining agreement.
The Union asserts that the method by which the Employer
directed and controlled the job shoppers mandates that the job
shoppers be deemed employees under the collective
agreement.

bargaining

To support this contention the Union relies upon a

number of job related factors that pinpoint the nature of the
Company's control over the job shoppers:
a. the Employer supervised the job shoppers;
b. the Employer hired, fired, laid-off,
disciplined, tested, accepted, and rejected the job shoppers;
c. the Employer set various standards for the
job shoppers;
d. the Employer determined the qualifications
of the job shoppers;
e. the Employer developed an orientation program
for the job shoppers and provided instructions
for them;
f. the Employer assigned the job shoppers work
and provided tools and equipment to them;
g. the Employer set the work schedules of the
job shoppers;
h. the Employer arranged for security clearance
for the job shoppers and provided them with
permanent employee identification badges; and
i. the Employer fixed the rate of compensation
for the job shoppers either directly or
indirectly.
On the basis of these factors the Union claims that the job
shoppers were employees of the Employer, indistinguishable from
regular MDA-represented employees, and not independent contractor
or employees of the various job shop companies.

To the extent

that the job shop companies fixed individual rates of pay of job
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shoppers, it is the Union's view that the Employer and the job
shop companies were at least joint employers.
The Union also asserts that the Purchase Order of the
Employer (Company Exhibit 29 at 7) proves that the job shoppers
were employees of the Employer.

The Union contends that this

document, as a contract with the job shops, shows that the Employer acted as an employer because the Purchase Order vested
the Employer with the right to cause the individual job shopper
to "cease performing work on this contract . . . . "
The Union characterizes

the Employer's claim that the job

shoppers were employees of the employment agencies as a legal
fiction.

In support, the Union cited a number of arbitration,

National Labor Relations Board and judicial decisions as proof
that from a labor relations standpoint the Company was the
employer.
The Union maintains that the job shoppers performed what
would otherwise constitute bargaining unit work side by side with
regular MDA-represented employees and received

substantially

higher compensation for producing lower quality work.
stresses that this arrangement undermined

The Union

the bargaining unit

by avoiding the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and
by discriminating against those employees who belonged to the
Union.
Accordingly, the Union reasons that the job shoppers were
or should be subject to the collective bargaining agreement as
"employees" within the meaning of Article I.
Developing its argument further the Union asserts that the

-7Employer violated Article II of the agreement because the job
shoppers, as employees, performed bargaining unit work without
being placed in the MDA bargaining unit.

And alternatively, the

Union rejects the Employer's argument that Article II is limited
to employees of the Employer, arguing instead that Article II is
a broad commitment to preserving the bargaining unit work regardless of whether engineers, supervisors, or job shoppers are involved .
2. The job shop operations was not a subcontract within the meaning of Article XXXI.
The Union stresses that the Employer never used a job
shopper to perform MDA work during the history of the contractual
/t
relationship between the parties before the 1979-1980 strike.
The Union claims that the failure of the Employer to utilize job
shoppers in the past—when additional workers would have been
helpful to fulfill production demands--supports the Union's
assertion that the Employer understood that the use of job
shoppers was not sub-contracting under Article XXXI and would
have breached the collective bargaining agreement.
at 13 (citing

(Union brief

Pearson at XIV/147-50).)

The Union juxtaposes the Employer's failure to use job
shoppers until 1979-1980 with the bargaining history of Article
II of the collective bargaining agreement.

The significance of

* The Union did cite the example of an employee of the ElectroDynamics Division of General Dynamics who performed non-bargaining unit work at Groton in 1975. But that was pursuant to an
agreement with the Union that it "shall not constitite a precedent
for any purpose whatsoever."
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the two, according to the Union is that the Employer had the
burden to obtain a modification of the language in the agreement
if it sought to use job shoppers.

The Union asserts that Para-

graph 11 of the Strike Settlement Agreement which specified that
all job shoppers were to be removed from the premises of the
Employer by August 18, 1980, is an acknowledgement by the Company
that job shoppers could be used during the strike, but that their
use after the strikers had returned would be a contract violation
The Union highlights the fact that Paragraph 11 of the
Strike Settlement Agreement distinguishes between job shoppers
and employees of subcontractors as proof that the parties
recognized a distinction between these types of workers.

These

terms in the Strike Settlement Agreement are interpreted by the
Union as signifying that the Employer viewed the use of job
shoppers as different from the use of subcontractors.

Thus,

though the use of subcontractors would not have required the
consent of the Union, the Union contends that the Company understood that the use of job shoppers would violate the collective
bargaining agreement unless the Union consented to such a practice
As further evidence of the ban on the use of job shoppers,
the Union argues that the addition of Article II in the 1973
negotiations--to prohibit non-bargaining unit employees from performing bargaining unit work--has remained unchanged and has
strengthened the past practice and contractual interpretation
that the Employer was not permitted to use job shoppers.
Additionally, the Union rejects the Employer's notion that
there is an industry practice at other shipyards that somehow
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supersedes the provisions, practices, and rights that stem from
the instant collective bargaining agreement.
3. Assuming arguendo that utilizing job
shoppers was subcontracting, the Employer
did not comply with Article XXXI.
If the Arbitrator should find that the use of job shoppers
was subcontracting within the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement, the Union contends that the Employer violated
Article XXXI because proper facilities and personnel were available to perform the work and because the Employer acted in bad
faith.

The Union views Article XXXI as a limited exception to

the thrust of the collective bargaining agreement, namely that
bargaining unit work shall only be performed by members of the
bargaining unit.

The Union insists that if Article XXXI is re-

stricted as it should be, to the explicit conditions under which
subcontracting is allowed, the use of job shoppers is barred,
especially since the job shoppers performed a large volume of
fundamental bargaining unit work.
The Union argues that Article XXXI permits the Company to
subcontract bargaining unit work only when proper facilities and
employees are not available.

By the use of the conjunction

"and"

in Article XXXI, the Union maintains that the parties intended to
permit subcontracting only off the Employer's premises and only
under the control of another employer.

Asserting that it is un-

disputed that proper facilities existed within the meaning of
Article XXXI when the job shoppers performed the work on the
Employer's premises, the Union views the issue as narrowed to
whether proper employees were available to perform this work.
this regard, the Union relies upon the following factors as

In

-10support for its assertion that bargaining unit employees existed
to perform the work:
a. The Employer should have loaned or transferred MDA-represented employees across work
categories, functional categories, and departments to perform the various work.
b. The Employer should have hired full-time,
bargaining unit employees by implementing an
efficient hiring campaign rather than its inefficient effort that was marked by an erroneous
advertisement that various publications printed
on November 2, November 3, and November 9, 1980
followed by another erroneous advertisement that
appeared on November 28 and November 30, 1980.
c. The Employer should not have reduced the
overtime in Department 459. On the contrary,
the continued scheduling of pre-job shopper
levels of overtime in Department 459 would have
obviated the need for job shoppers.
d. The Employer should not have delayed the recall of the strikers because the Company knew it
had a production problem. Thus the Employer's
delayed recall in Department 459--despite the
willingness and availability of strikers from
that department to return to work—reduced the
manpower that was available to perform bargaining unit work and resulted in a decreased level
of production.
4.

The Employer acted in bad faith:

a. The Union argues that the Employer engaged
in a brutal campaign to break the Union and to
undermine its credibility as the bargaining
agent. It relies upon the 1979 negotiations,
alleged unfair labor practices committed by the
Employer, the delayed recall, and the reintroduction of the job shoppers (who had served as
"scabs" during the 1979-1980 strike) as proof of
the Company's attitude.
b. The Union insists that the Employer had many
alternatives to deal with its alleged production
problems that would have been less costly, less
provocative, and more productive than the use of
job shoppers. In Nuclear Department 480, the
Union claims that the Employer could have eliminated
the supposed shortage of five electrical designers

-11by subcontracting out various work such as
the corrections that needed to be made to
the Trident's designs and/or the commissioned
vessel work to the Quincy Shipyard. The Union
reiterates that the Employer should have assigned the 12 regular MDA employees in the electrical
group to modest overtime and should have recalled
more of the strikers prior to August 18, 1980.
Nor should the Company have masked its true intentions by its "camel in the tent" approach to
introducing job shoppers in Groton from the
Union's standpoint.
As further evidence of the Employer's bad
faith, the Union emphasizes that the Employer
failed to reasonably pursue the Union leads concerning nine experienced electrical designers who
were interested in working for the Company. After
raising the possibility that the Employer could
have utilized loans and transfers to solve the
production problems, the Union cites the inefficient hiring campaign as further evidence
that the Employer failed to act in good faith
in trying to avoid the use of job shoppers.
c. With respect to Department 459 (Non-Nuclear)
and Department 460 (Construction Support), the
Union contends that the Employer failed to use
additional options. The Union argues that the
Employer could have subcontracted out low level
drafting work and had routinely subcontracted out
huge quantities of design and drafting work in
the past. The Union stresses that the need for
job shoppers would have been eliminated if the
Employer had maintained the level of overtime
that the employees of Department 459 had worked
from September 1980 to January 1981. As the
Employer reduced or eliminated overtime in those
areas when the job shoppers arrived, the Union
reiterates that the Company did not act reasonably
in trying to avoid using job shoppers.
In light of these circumstances, the Union argues that the
Employer should not have delayed the recall of the strikers,
should have offered permanent employee positions to job shoppers
before March 6, 1981, and should have authorized the hiring of
new employees at rates of pay higher than the drafting level.
The Union also contends that the Employer should have sought
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the cooperation of the Union (which would have been forthcoming)
to solve any alleged production problems rather than to deceive
the Union by concealing the decision to use job shoppers on a
massive scale, specifically the use of hundreds of job shoppers
in Non-Nuclear as opposed to five or six electrical designers in
Nuclear.
The Union claims that the Employer failed to provide
relevant information in December 1980 concerning the use of job
shoppers in the future as further evidence of bad faith.

Similar'

ly, the Union views the Employer's delayed response to the Union':
request on December 29, 1980, for a grievance meeting about the
job shoppers who began to work on December 22, as evidence that
the Employer did not care about the Union or its members and
would act without considering the impact of such decisions on
them.
Companion to its argument that the Company acted in bad
faith, the Union disputes the Employer's assertion that the use
of job shoppers was a business necessity.

As background, the

Union acknowledges that it treated seriously the Company's position during the 1979-1980 strike that there were too many
designers, and that concern over that issue prolonged the strike.
The subsequent insistence by the Employer for a delayed recall of
the strikers after the Union ratified the collective bargaining
agreement is judged by the Union to reveal the Employer's purpose
to prolong the strike and further alienating

the strikers.

The

Union dismisses as a pretext the Employer's claim that a delayed
recall was necessary because certain projects were only partially
completed; that there was insufficient work for the returning

-13design people; and that management required an orderly return to
work of the strikers.

Instead, the Union insists that the real

reason for the delayed recall was the Employer's desire to punish
the Union and its supporters.

Consequently, the Union maintains

that the job shoppers who worked during the strike could have been
phased out faster and that, if necessary, the Union would have
authorized some job shoppers who worked during the strike to
continue at work in return for a faster recall of the strikers.
The Union challenges the Employer's alleged fear of a lack of
work for designers as contrary to the facts.

It claims there

was significant schedule slippage in Department 459 that caused
delinquencies to occur and which could have been cured by an
earlier recall of designers.

The Union also contends that any

surplus of workers existed only in the clerical area whereas a
net loss of design personnel had developed as of May 1980.

With

respect to the Employer's alleged need for an orderly return of
the strikers as justification for the delayed recall, the Union
points to the immediate recall of strikers in 1973 following a
strike involving the MDA, in 1975 following a strike by the MTC,
and in 1980 following a strike by the Quincy designers, as evidenc
that the Employer could have recalled the MDA strikers in 1980
immediately or more quickly upon the conclusion of the strike.
The Union argues that an immediate recall of the strikers
would have obviated any need for the subsequent use of job shopper
If the Employer had immediately recalled the strikers, their output would have offset the shortfall that the Company subsequently
cited as its business need for engaging the job shoppers.

-14Similarly, as previously discussed, the Union characterizes the
Employer's failure to use overtime and to subcontract out work
in combination with--in the Union's view—the Employer's delayed
and futile hiring campaign as evidence that the so-called workload problem was highly exaggerated.

The Union maintains that

the hiring efforts engaged in by the Company were mere responses
to the Union's grievance.
The Union questions whether there was a true business
necessity to use job shoppers with the following points.

First,

the Union cites a lack of documentary evidence concerning the
decision to use job shoppers. Second, the Union emphasizes the
inaccurate data and projections that the Employer relied upon in
reaching the decision to use job shoppers as evidence that there
was not a business need to use them.

Third, the Union claims

that there was not a genuine workload problem as typified by the
following examples :
. the workload was routine or light by
January 1981;
. there was no drafting work for the job
shoppers who had dealings with Chargeman
Donch;
. there was no work for Senior Designer
Apfelback from January through midFebruary 1981 because of the presence
of the job shoppers; and
. the Employer refused to rehire Bruce
Soden due to a lack of work for designers.
The Union raises the possibility that the Employer created
the circumstances to establish for the Union and possibly the
Navy, the precedent of using job shoppers.

Thus the Union

questions the "neutral" business judgment of James Ashton, who

-15was the Company's Assistant General Manager for Engineering,
concerning the decision to use job shoppers.

Finally, the Union

suggests that the Employer had a financial incentive to use job
shoppers by billing the Navy on a "cost plus" basis for the job
shop program.
5.

Remedy.

The Union seeks a remedy composed of the following elements
a. A retroactive raise in the salary scale
of the members of the bargaining unit for
the period of time that job shoppers were on
the premises to be calculated on a proportionate basis with the job shoppers' rates of
compensation serving as the minimum;
b. A payment of damages to bargaining unit
members who should have performed the work
to be calculated on the basis of the amount
of work actually performed by the job shoppers
as reflected in the Employer's records; and
c. A payment of damages to the Union for union
dues and initiation fees that the union security
clause in Article III requires for each employee,
namely, a $300 initiation fee for each job shopper
who worked over 30 calendar days and union dues
of $12 per month for each month of employment.

-16CONTENTIONS OF THE EMPLOYER
1.

Job shopping is a form of subcontracting
under the agreement.

The Employer asserts that the purpose of the bargaining
unit work and subcontracting clauses is to preserve full employment for the members of the bargaining unit.

At the same time,

the Employer claims that this purpose must be balanced with the
Company's need to economically and efficiently operate the
business.

In the instant case the Employer argues that the use

of job shoppers did not adversely affect the employees because
they were fully employed, worked substantial amounts of overtime,
and ultimately grew in number.

If the Employer had not engaged

job shoppers, the Employer maintains that its effectiveness in
securing work from the Navy would have been diminished.
As the Company views the job shoppers as permissible subcontracting, it sees no "clear and convincing evidence" of a duty
contractual or otherwise to require

it to pay a "tariff" or

"price" for the use of job shoppers.
It is the Employer's position that nothing contained in
the collective bargaining agreement limits its right to use job
shoppers.

The Employer interprets Article II as covering actual

employees of the Company, whereas Article XXXI applies to persons
who are not employees of the Company.

The Employer reads Article

I as determinative of the meaning and scope of Article II, namely
that non-bargaining unit employees means persons such as those
who are represented by the MTC, the Patternmakers, as well as
salaried and supervisory employees.

Insofar as non-Company

employees are concerned, the Employer insists that Article XXXI
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is the only clause limiting the Employer's right in this area.
The Employer, therefore, views the collective bargaining agreement to permit the use of subcontractors if the members of the
bargaining unit are fully employed.

With respect to the distinc-

tion between farming in work and farming out work the Company
considers the collective bargaining agreement to be silent.

It

reasons that there is no prohibition against farming in work because the parties could have included such a limitation if they
had so intended.

Accordingly, the Employer considers farming in

work as a management right that is subject only to the limitations
of Article XXXI.
From a legal and practical standpoint the Employer rejects
the Union's argument that job shoppers are employees of the
Company.

Specifically, the Employer considers the purchase orders

with the job shops, in which the job shops are designated as subcontractors of the Employer, as determinative of the legal relationship between the Employer and the job shoppers.
er cites the practice of job shoppers

The Employ-

working as employees of

individual job shops on a continuing basis as proof that the
Employer, the job shops, and the job shoppers acted in a manner
consistent with an intent that the job shops be subcontractors of
the Employer.

The Employer also relies on arbitration decisions

involving the Pomona Division and the Convair Division to reenforce the argument that the Arbitrator should not find that the
job
shoppers are employees of the Company.
•

The Employer urges

the Arbitrator to follow the precedents established in these
cases, and asserts that the Arbitrator lacks the power to change

-18the terms of the collective bargaining agreement which permits
job shoppers under the subcontracting clause.
The Employer points out that job shopping is a recognized
form of subcontracting within the marine design industry and that
most, if not all, of the major shipyards throughout the nation
use job shoppers to supplement permanent employee design forces.
Consequently, the Employer considers job shopping to be a
"customary function of management" within the meaning of Article
V, the management rights clause.
The Employer insists that a past practice of not using job
shoppers is irrelevant to determining whether the Company had a
contractual right to do so.

This is especially true, according

to the Employer, when circumstances in the past did not warrant
the use of job shoppers.

The Employer dismisses the 1975 agree-

ment to permit an out-of-state employee to work at the Groton
facility as inadmissible because it was expressly deemed not to
be used as a precedent for any purpose whatsoever.
With respect to the subcontracting clause, the Employer
claims that the collective bargaining agreement did not contain
a subcontracting clause before 1966; that the Union demanded such
a clause in 1966; that the parties ultimately included a subcontracting clause in the collective bargaining agreement; and
that the Union proposed the clause which was identical to the
language in the collective bargaining agreement between the
Employer and the MTC.

The Company underscores that it used on-

premises subcontractors to perform MTC bargaining unit work before and after 1966 and continued to do so even though

the

parties revised the subcontracting clause in the MTC collective

-19-

bargaining agreement in 1968.

It states the Union was and is

familiar with job shopping because its members worked as job
shoppers elsewhere during the 1973 strike.

It points to the

Union's failure in 1973 and 1976, despite this familiarity and
experience, to suggest that the subcontracting clause did not
permit the use of job shoppers, as evidence of the Union's
knowledge that using job shoppers did not violate the subcontracting clause.

Although the Union challenged the Employer's right

to use job shoppers when the parties negotiated the current
collective bargaining agreement, the Employer says that it disputed that challenge and that no contract language barring job
shoppers found its way into the contract.

Hence, the Company now

asserts that the management rights clause and the zipper clause
(Article XXXIV) in the current agreement foreclose the Union from
implying a contract bar to on-premises subcontracting.
2.

The Employer's use of job shoppers fully
complied with the standards set forth in
Article XXXI.

The Employer interprets Article XXXI as prohibiting the
use of subcontractors only if employees are available and if the
Employer engaged the subcontractors
continuing work.

to deprive the employees of

With respect to the former requirement, the

Company contends that it could not accomplish its work with the
workforce that existed in the fall of 1981.

The Company relies

upon Company Exhibits 48 to 53 to show that there was a critical
manpower shortage despite the fact that members of the bargaining
unit worked the same level of overtime as was worked during the
1979-1980 strike.

As further proof of the manpower problem, the

Employer claims that engineering management concluded there was a
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The

Employer maintains that James Ashton relied upon the recommendations from the engineering managers that there was such a shortage
when he decided to engage job shoppers.

The Employer disputes the

Union's claim that bargaining unit employees were idle during this
time frame and specifically attacks the credibility of Union
witnesses Max Stiber and Joseph Apfelbeck (bargaining unit employees in the mechanical area) due to their limited knowledge on
the subject.

To refute such testimony, the Employer offers the

testimony of William Philips (Chief of Mechanical Design) as
verifying the manpower shortage in Department 459.

Likewise, the

Company relies upon the testimony of Leonard Hutchins (Chief of
Electrical Design) to negate the testimony of Michael Donch (a
bargaining unit employee in the electrical area) concerning the
existence of a manpower shortage in that area.
The Employer insists that the collective bargaining agreement did not require it to hire new employees, use overtime, or
use other alternatives.

The Employer points out that arbitrators

do not require employers to use overtime prior to subcontracting,
when the agreement, as here, lacks a clause that specifically
guarantees overtime.

The Employer refers to arbitration awards

between the Patternmakers and the Company as well as the MTC and
the Company as authority for this conclusion.

It also rejects the

Union's hindsight suggestion that to recall all strikers immediate
ly upon the end of the strike would have precluded the use of subcontractors.

This claim is viewed by the Employer as ill-founded

because it assumes that all of the strikers who could have perform
ed drafting work were available for an immediate recall. Also,

-21because the parties had negotiated a gradual return of strikers,
the Employer contends it had the lawful right to proceed that way.
And that the Union cannot now impeach that agreement or cite its
implementation to impute bad faith or contractual error to the
Company's action.

Finally, the Employer represents that no em-

ployees were on layoff when it engaged job shoppers.
The Employer asserts that, even if it had an obligation to
employ reasonable alternatives before claiming that no employees
were available, it did so.

It contends that it considered such

reasonable alternatives as hiring, the use of overtime, and contracting out before it decided to use job

shoppers.

The expenditure of over $300,000 for the hiring campaign
is viewed by the Employer as a reasonable action that actually
resulted in bringing the use of job shoppers to an end by September
1981.

The Employer denies any obligation to hire higher paid

designers instead of the number of lower paid draftsmen it actuall
required.

Furthermore, hiring unnecessary designers would have

reduced promotional opportunities for draftsmen in the bargaining
unit and, therefore, the Employer decided against such an approach
until January 1981 when circumstances justified doing so.

In

addition, the Employer denies that it had a special obligation to
hire former employees and asserts that former employees were not
available in any event.
The Company claims that the use of overtime would not have
solved the production problem.

Although the affected areas of

the bargaining unit had worked substantial amounts of overtime,
the Employer dismisses additional overtime as a viable alternative
because extended overtime does not produce proportional increases
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in productivity.

Instead, the Employer notes that extended over-

time leads to an increase in overtime refusals.

The Employer

stresses that the average level of overtime at the height of the
use of job shoppers was almost identical to the average level of
overtime before the bulk of the job shoppers arrived.
The Company asserts that economy and efficiency eliminated
the alternative of farming out a greater portion of the workload
than it actually did farm out.

For example, the Employer cites

the need for certain work to be completed in conjunction with
access to the submarines or liason with designers.

Nor was it

practical, in the judgment of the Employer, to farm out certain
work because to do so would have required the duplicating of many
documents, or such documents would have been off of the Company's
property and unavailable for use by the permanent workforce.
Consequently, the Employer contends that it exercised
appropriate business judgment by using job shoppers.

It claims

that management pared down the original projections of the number
of job shoppers that it required by 40 percent.

Even though job

shoppers were more expensive and less efficient, the Company insists that using job shoppers was the only way to complete the
work on time.
The Employer denies that it subcontracted work "in order to
deprive employees of continuing work" within the meaning of Article
XXXI.

The Company relies upon Arbitrator Donald White's opinion

involving the same language in a case at the Quincy Division as
placing the burden on the Union to show that the Company's purpose
was to deprive employees of continuing work.

The Employer also

notes that the MTC collective bargaining agreement no longer
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contains the "in order to deprive" language.

Based upon the facts

before it, the Employer maintains that it made a good faith,
measured business judgment to improve scheduling difficulties and
not to disadvantage the Union.
3.

The Union's claim that the Company failed
to provide it with adequate data is wholly
without substance.

The Employer contends that it complied with the full disclosure provision contained in the final step of the grievance
procedure.

The Employer considers the Award of Arbitrator Robert

L. Stutz as binding on the parties with respect to the meaning of
that provision.

Thus the Employer does not consider the collective

bargaining agreement to require that "evidence" be disclosed prior
to an arbitration hearing; rather the full disclosure provision
only requires "information regarding evidence" to be exchanged.
The Company interprets its conduct concerning the use of job
shoppers as consistent with the requirements of the full disclosure provision and the grievance procedure.

At each stage,

the Employer asserts that it exchanged the required information
with the Union and that during the course of the hearings the
Arbitrator resolved whatever disputes remained.

In addition, the

Employer claims that it provided suitable witnesses to testify
about the events in question.
4.

The Union's assertion that the Company
"acted in bad faith" is itself made in
bad faith.

The Employer recognizes that the 1979-1980 strike was unpleasant and reflected troubled labor relations between the
parties.

It is the view of the Employer, however, that the Union

unnecessarily prolonged the tensions fchat the strike generated.

-24As evidence of the Union's bad faith, the Employer points
to the Union's reliance on non-probative "evidence" that the Union
withdrew at the hearing, to support the claim that the Employer
engaged in unlawful conduct during the pre-strike and post-strike
periods.

For example, the Employer argues that the Arbitrator

accepted the complaint of the National Labor Relations Board against the Employer into evidence only for historical purposes,
but the Union, nevertheless, urges the Arbitrator to treat that
complaint as probative of the way in which the Company welcomed
back the strikers.

The Employer characterizes this conduct as

constituting bad faith and reiterates the hearsay nature of the
complaint and the information that led to its issuance.

In

addition, the Employer considers the Union's assertion that the
Employer bargained in bad faith during the 1979-1980 contract
negotiations to be totally without foundation.

The Employer

argues that the Union accepted virtually the same proposal in
May 1980 that the Employer had offered in March

1980.

The Employer maintains that the Union's assertion that the
Employer recalled strikers in bad faith distorts the record and
ignores the fact that the parties bargained for precisely the
procedure the Company followed.

The Employer claims that it was

unsure of the volume of work that would exist after the strike
and therefore sought the phased-in recall.

The Employer says that

at that time the Union sought assurances that strikers could return to work at later dates because many of them were dispersed
around the country working themselves as job shoppers.

In light

of these circumstances, the Employer insists that it needed and
gained time to plan the recall and that these reasons further
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explained the recall schedule.

As far as the actual recall of

the strikers is concerned, the Employer contends that it based
its decisions on the operational needs that developed after the
strike and the preferences of the returning employees.

With

respect to the significance of the requirement that job shoppers
leave at the end of the recall period, the Company explains that
the parties simply assumed that there would only be a limited
amount of work available after the strike and neither party
predicted the influx of new work and the net decrease in the
workforce.
In responding to the "camel in the tent" claim of the Union,
the Employer denies that it intended to deceive the Union regarding the magnitude of the job shopper program.

Instead, the

Company points out that at first it only knew that Department 480
required some job shoppers.

Faced with the inability of its

hiring campaign to do anything but offset the rate of severances,
the Employer claims that it was necessary to engage job shoppers
even though it recognized that Union members harbored hard feelings toward the job shoppers who had worked during the strike.

As

further evidence of its good faith, the Employer stressed that it
was willing to hire job shoppers as permanent employees and did
so.

As a result of this effort and the overall hiring effort,

the Company eliminated job shoppers from the shipyard as of
September 25, 1981.
5.

Remedy.

The Employer contends that the Arbitrator should deny the
grievance.

The Employer views as absurd the claim for proportion-

al increases in the salary of all bargaining unit members, and as

-26-

irrational the payment to bargaining unit employees in the
affected areas of a sum measured by the amount of work performed
by the job shoppers.

Because the Employer asserts that it did

not violate the collective bargaining agreement, it argues that
the Arbitrator need not reach the issue of remedy.

OPINION

Article I: (Employee Status)

The parties disagree over whether job shoppers are "employees" within the meaning of Article I, the recognition clause,
*
of the agreement.
The Union position is that job shoppers are
indistinguishable from MDA-represented employees by virtue of
the work they performed and the relationship that the job shopper
had with the Employer.

On the other hand, the Employer's claim

is that the job shoppers are different than MDA-represented employees as a result of their special status in the marine design
industry and as reflected by the contractual relationships between the various job shop companies and the Employer and between the job shoppers and the various job shop companies.
The record before me indicates the following

information.

The contractual relationship between the job shoppers and the
Company arose from purchase orders between the Company and the
job shop companies.

The purchase orders specified that the job

shop companies were subcontractors of the Company and that the
job shoppers were to be employees of the job shops.

The job

shops recruited and hired the job shoppers, individually negotiated the rates of pay and benefits of the job shoppers, and paid
them. The Company supervised the work that the job shoppers
produced.

It informed the job shops when it no longer needed

*It is undisputed that the job shoppers performed work normally
performed by bargaining unit employees.
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and/or desired the services of a job shopper.

The Company also

assigned work to the job shoppers, supervised their work, and,
on occasion, provided tools and equipment.

It also provided

identification badges to the job shoppers.
Article I is silent with respect to its applicability to
job shoppers.

In fact, Article I does not expressly define the

term "employee."

Instead, Article I excludes from recognition

employees represented by the Metal Trades Council (MTC) and by
the Patternmaker's Association; employees in enumerated sections,
functions, or departments; certain secretaries; and all salaried
and supervisory employees.

The Recognition Clause, however,

expressly includes "employees in technical and clerical classifications working in Engineering and Engineering support functions
who are employed in the Employer's facilities in Connecticut . .
. ." Notwithstanding these provisions, Article I fails to explicitly set forth precise standards, definitions or factors for
determining whether the parties intended to treat job shoppers
as employees within the meaning of the collective bargaining
agreement.
Accordingly, the Arbitrator must determine whether the term
"employee" as used in Article I embraces job shoppers.

In making

a finding of employee status, it is appropriate to consider, and
the parties have recognized the relevance of decisions by the
courts and the National Labor Relations Board.
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of
employee status in NLRB v. United Insurance Company of America,
390 U.S. 254 (1968).

In enforcing an NLRB order that certain
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debit agents were employees and not independent contractors
under Section 2 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
the Court concluded that:
Congress passed an amendment specifically
excluding "any individual having the status
of an independent contractor" from the definition of "employee" contained in 5 2(3) of
the Act. The obvious purpose of this amendment was to have the Board and the courts
aPply general agency principles in distinguishing between employees and independent contractors under the Act . . . . (T)he proper standard
here is the law of the agency. Thus there is
no doubt that we should apply the common-law
test here in distinguishing an employee from
an independent contractor.
Id. at 256 (footnote omitted).

In finding that the law of the

agency is to be used to determine employee status, the Court also
recognized that such a ruling must be based on the special facts
surrounding the particular relationship.

The Court observed that:

There is no shorthand formula or magic phrase
that can be applied to find the answer, but
all of the incidents of the relationship must
be assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive. What is important is that the
total factual context is assessed in light of
the pertinent common-law agency principles.
Id. at 258 (emphasis added).

Thus the total factual circumstances

surrounding the relationship between the Company and the job
shoppers become critical in determining whether the job shoppers
were employees.
I have reviewed all the cases cited by the parties on this
question.

Though the following cases cited by the Union appear,

based on the particular circumstances involved thereon, to be
supportive of the Union's claim that job shoppers are "employees"
of the Company, I reach a different conclusion when the "totality"

-4of all the circumstances material to job shopping is considered.
In Phoenix Closures, Inc., v. United Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers of America, Local 190, 57 Lab. Arb. 1131 (1971)
(Doppelt, Arb.), the Union represented several grievants who
sought to be treated as employees under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement between the parties after having worked
on the employer's premises to relieve a production backlog caused
by the summer vacations of regular employees.

The grievants

obtained the work through a labor referral service and each worke
for approximately one month.

The parties had agreed that all

such workers would be paid the rates and benefits provided for
in the collective bargaining agreement.

The Arbitrator distin-

guished the recruiting of the workers from the control that the
employer exercised over the workers after they had started to
work and concluded that the reservation of full control by the
Company was determinative of the dispute.

As a result, the

Arbitrator found the workers to be employees.

Certain facts in

this case distinguish it from the instant arbitration.

In

Phoenix the union and employer agreed that the workers would be
paid the rates and benefits of the collective bargaining agreement.

Also, by filing a grievance, the individual workers sought

regular employee status.

Both circumstances which would support

de facto contract coverage for those workers, are significantly
missing from the job shop fact pattern.
In National Opinion Research Center, 187 N.L.R.B. No. 93,
76 L.R.R.M. 1090

(1970) (Miller, Fanning, Brown & Jenkins), the

-5NLRB found that interviewers who the employer recruited, trained,
assigned work, and retained the right to terminate were employees
and not independent contractors. The decision arose in a representation proceeding so that the union necessarily submitted a
showing of interest regarding the desire of such workers to be
treated as employees rather than as independent contractors.

The

Board analyzed the control that the employer exercised and found
that it outweighed the evidence that the employer had presented
to prove independent contractor status.

The Board also found

that a substantial number of interviewers worked as regular parttime employees.
In National Opinion the workers involved sought to be
represented by the union and covered by the collective bargaining
contract.

That action manifested an intent by those employees to

become part of the bargaining unit.
those employees directly.

Also, the employer recruited

In the instant job shop situation, the

job shops rather than the Employer recruited the job shoppers and
treferred them to the Employer pursuant to the purchase orders.
Also, I think there is a significant difference between a representation petition, where the workers as a cohesive group seek
regular employee status and the instant arbitration where no such
group

action or interest was manifested.
TheSeventh Circuit in NLRB v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance

Co_^,167 F.2d 983, 22 L.R.R.M. 2089 (7th Cir. 1948), found salesmen who had a relationship of a permanent character with the
company, including a retirement and pension plan, to be employees
for purpose of coverage under the National Labor Relations Act.

-6The Sixth Circuit found in NLRB v. Pepsi Cola Bottling
Co., 79 L.R.R.M. 2579 (6th Cir. 1972), that distributors who,
inter alia, received yearly vacations and sick leave were employees and not independent contractors.

As a result, the court

enforced the NLRB order requiring the company to cease and
desist from engaging in unfair labor practices and to affirmatively bargain with the union.
Unlike the instant job shop circumstances, Phoenix involved
workers who were included in the employer's retirement and
pension plan, thereby linking them more closely to regular employee status, and Pepsi Cola involved workers who received
yearly vacations and sick leave, traditional indicia of regular
employment.
In News-Journal Co. v. NLRB, 77 L.R.R.M. 2846 (3rd Cir.
1971), the Third Circuit found that 21 truck-driver deliverymen,
who had previously worked for the company as mail room employees,
were employees and not independent contractors.

There were no

other persons performing the delivery function.
The Fifth Circuit in NLRB v. Deaton, Inc., 87 L.R.R.M. 2545
(5th Cir. 1974) (Deaton II), enforced an' NLRB order that found
drivers of trucks owned by others and leased to Deaton to be
employees of Deaton.

In applying the "right to control" test in

the context of interstate trucking, the court highlighted the
fact that "the Board took into account the substantial nexus of
control required by federal regulations." Id. at 2548.

In so do-

ing, the court sustained the Board's determination that such
drivers were entitled to representational rights despite certain
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changes made by the company since Deaton Truck Line, Inc. v.
NLRB, 57 L.R.R.M. 2209 (5th Cir. 1964 (Deaton I), enforcing
Deaton Truck Lines, Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. No. 124, 53 L.R.R.M. 1497
(1963).
A careful reading of the three foregoing cases reveals
that the trucking industry is affected by certain special federal
regulations and policies that encourage a finding of employeremployee relationship.
To my mind the decisions in these three cases were significantly founded on ICC regulations that are "an additional wrinkl
on the control test" and are designed to "promote safe operation
of trucks and to insure continuous financial responsibility so
that truck-related losses will not go uncompensated." Deaton II
at 2547.
I find no such special policy considerations involved in
the instant arbitration.
Also, in the foregoing trucking cases, the workers involved
appeared to have continuous employment and in some instances at
least were the only ones performing the truck driving work.
Neither condition obtained in the instant arbitration.
An arbitration case, United Furniture Workers of America y.
Furniture Workers International Staff Union, 72 La. Arb. 819
(1979) (Williams, Arb.) involved a representational dispute between
a union in its capacity as an employer and another union in its
role as a union.

In fixing an appropriate bargaining unit, the

Arbitrator indicated:
There are generally four elements to be
considered in determining whether an

-8employer-employee relationship exists:
the selection and hiring of the employees,
the payment of wages, the power of dismissal, and the power to control and direct
the employee's conduct. Power to control
the work is the most important of these,
the payment of wages is the next most
important.
The Arbitrator analyzed these factors and concluded that
four persons were supervisors and therefore excluded from collective bargaining, two persons were employees of the International
Union and one an employee of a local union and excluded from the
bargaining unit sought.
Applying the foregoing four elements to the job shopper
case provides an inconclusive result.

The Employer controlled

and directed the job shopper's work, yet the job shops and not
the Employer determined and paid the wages.

If limited to these

two considerations, the edge might appear to be in favor of the
"power to control" the work, but the other elements need to be
considered as well.

The selection and hiring of the job shoppers

was done by the job shops and not the Employer.

As for the

Arbitrator's reference to the "power of dismissal," a reading of
the case indicates that he is referring to the power to discharge
in a disciplinary sense.

In the job shop situation it is not at

all clear and probably doubtful that the Employer has the power
to directly discipline or disciplinarily discharge a job shopper.
Rather, as a client of the job shop, the Employer may be able to
effectuate a discharge or discipline by complaint to the job shop.
But I am not persuaded that the latter arrangement is what
Arbitrator Williams meant by the "power of dismissal."
What I consider to be more determinative are the two

-9arbitration cases directly involving the use of job shoppers,
albeit a different type, by General Dynamics.

In International

Association of Machinists, Silvergate District, Lodge 50 and
Convair Division of General Dynamics, (1967) (Kagel, Arb.),
the Machinists claimed that job shoppers (tool and die makers and
jig and fixtures builders), who worked for no longer than four
months, were employees under the terms of the agreement then in
effect between the parties. Despite the contention by the
Machinists that the job shoppers "should have been treated as a
person coming under the terms of the Convair-I.A.M. Agreement"
(Id_.at 8), the Arbitrator concluded that General Dynamics "did
not violate the collective bargaining agreement when such personnel worked on the premises of Convair but not under the terms
of the I. A.M.-Convair collective bargaining agreement." I_d_.at 13.
That decision did not uphold the union's claim that such job
shoppers were employees under that collective bargaining agreemen
In the other matter, between General Dynamics Corp.,
Pomona Division and Aerospace Workers, District Lodge #120,
(1982) (Kotin, Arb.) the arbitrator rejected the union's claim
that job shoppers (metal working personnel) were employees under
the collective bargaining agreement even though they worked under
the same supervisory structure as members of the bargaining unit.
For years the marine design industry, though not this
particular Employer, has had experience using job shoppers.

That

they never have been considered or found to be employees creates
a presumption in my view, of non-employee status.
this case must rebut that presumption.

The Union in

Mixed evidence does not

-10meet the test.
Indeed, the decision of a significant number of the MDA
strikers during the 1979-1980 work stoppage to serve as job
shoppers around the country is probative evidence of the nonemployee nature of the job shopping arrangement.

The strikers

retained their employee status as strikers of the Company althoug
they were working as job shoppers at other companies in different
parts of the country.
To my mind, the foregoing cases support the view of the
United States Supreme Court in United Insurance that "all of the
incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with
no one factor being decisive."

In other words, the total factual

circumstances must be considered.

If we apply this view to the

instant job shopper case, I do not think that we can conclude tha
there is any preponderance of evidence or facts supportive of the
conclusion that the job shoppers are employees under the collective bargaining agreement.
At most, in my view, the essential facts and evidence
produce a mixed result on the critical question.

A mixed result

is not enough to warrant a new and indeed dramatic finding for
this industry and the Employer, that job shoppers are employees.

-11Article I: (Joint Employers
The Union also claims that the Employer and the job shops
were joint employers and that as a consequence of the joint
arrangement, the job shoppers become employees of the Employer
subject to the collective bargaining agreement.
Again all the cited cases were read and reviewed.
Manpower, Inc.,164 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 65 L.R.R.M. 1059 (1967)
(Fanning, Jenkins, & Zagoria), arose in the context of a representation proceeding before the NLRB.

The Board found over-the-

road truck drivers to constitute employees of both the supplier
of the drivers (Manpower) and of the user of the drivers (Armour)
To reach this result the Board analyzed the terms and conditions
of employment and found evidence of an employment relationship
with both employers.

As a result, the Board ordered an election

to determine whether the petitioning union should be certified as
the representative of the employees.
The NLRB found in Don Brentner Trucking Co., Inc., 232
N.L.R.B. No. 73, 97 L.R.R.M. 1113 (1977) (Fanning, Penello &
Murphy), that two affiliated businesses that had common officers,
supervisors, and labor policy were joint employers and therefore
the drivers of the trucks leased by one company to the other were
employees of both companies and not independent contractors.
In the latter case the "common officers, supervisors and
labor policy" clearly distinguishes it from the instant job
shopper issue.
I see nothing in Manpower that warrants a different result
from my earlier analysis and findings in News Journal, Deaton anc
National Freight. My reasons therein for not holding that job

-12-

shoppers were employees are equally determinative of the question
of whether the job shop and the Employer are joint employers.
The United States Supreme Court recognized in Boire v.
Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964), that determining whether
joint employer status exists in a representation proceeding "is
essentially a factual issue." Id. at 481. The Court therefore
refused to authorize an early review of the Board's determination
of joint employer status pursuant to an argument by Greyhound
based on Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958).

As the Union's

brief pointed out, Judge Rives subsequently enforced the Board's
order in NLRB v. Greyhound Corp., 63 L.R.R.M. 2434 (5th Cir. 1966
In summarizing the finding of the NLRB that Greyhound and the
contractor who supplied janitorial and loading services were
joint employers, the Court repeated that the Board had relied
upon the fact, inter alia, that the workers constituted a stable
unit.

The Fifth Circuit therefore found the Board's finding of

joint employer status to be based on substantial evidence of
Greyhound's control over the workers.
Unlike the personnel in Greyhound, I cannot find that the
job shoppers were "a stable unit."

Based on the record I con-

clude that the job shoppers were temporary, not only from the
standpoint of the job shops and the Employer but also from the
perspective of the job shoppers themselves.
An earlier NLRB

case, International Air Service Co., Ltd.,

216 N.L.R.B. No. 152, 88 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1975) (Jenkins, Kennedy
& Penello), found that a company that provided flight personnel
to an exempt employer under the National Labor Relations Act
(Japan Air Lines) shared the exemption because the services

-13provided by the flight crews were essential to the exempt employer's operations.

Thus International Air Service was not a sole

employer because there was, in essence, a permanent relationship
between the flight crews and the airlines that included the airline granting various benefits, providing extensive training,
directing day-to-day duties, controlling such activies, and
promoting pilots from a DC-8 to a Boeing 747.
This is distinguished from the job shopper circumstances
by the permanence of the employment relationship of the flight
personnel.

The agreed to arrangements for training for promotion

and the promotional system itself is evidence of the permanence
of the employment arrangement involving both companies.

There

are no comparable arrangements in the job shop-Employer relationship.
In the arbitration, Skaggs Pay Less Drug Stores and True
Recordings Corp. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 648, 52 Lab. Arb.
1082 (1969) (Killion, Arb.), the arbitrator concluded that there
was joint liability for wages and benefits of two employees.

The

arbitrator analyzed the control over wages, benefits, discipline,
and a prior determination that the employees of the retail store
(Pay Less) and its licensees (e.g. True Recordings) constituted
a single collective bargaining unit to find that they were joint
employers.
In a recent case, the Fifth Circuit enforced a Board order
that there was a joint employer relationship between a League and
its member clubs.

North American Soccer League v. NLRB, 613 F.2d

1379 (5th Cir. 1980).

The Court observed, "that minor differences

-14in the underlying facts might justify different findings on the
joint employer issue . . . . " Id. at 1382-83. The Court upheld
the Board's finding that the League's central control over labor
relations supported the joint employer designation.
In both cases the decisions were founded in significant
part on facts not present in the job shopper case.

In Skaggs

there had been a prior determination that the retail store and
the licensee constituted a single collective bargaining unit.
There is no such determination or even allegation of a similar
single unit for the Employer and the job shops.
In North American the central control of labor relations
formed the basis for the joint employer status of the League and
its member clubs.

In the instant arbitration there is no evidence

of any central control of labor relations applicable to both the
Employer and the job shops.
I find nothing added to the question of joint employership
by any of the other cases cited by the Union.
Considering the foregoing, I again do not see enough
evidence to find a joint employer status applicable to the job
shoppers.

As before stated, the presumption otherwise, has not

been rebutted.
With this finding it is unnecessary for me to cite and
review herein the cases relied on by the Employer in support of
its position that it and the job shops are not joint employers.

-15Article II

The parties disagree on the meaning of Article II.

The

Union claims that Article II bars job shoppers from performing
bargaining unit work.

The Employer contends that Article II does

not apply to job shoppers.
Article II is not specific in this regard.

On its face,

the term "non-bargaining unit employees" is ambiguous.

It may be

interpreted to mean any persons not belonging to the bargaining
unit by concluding that the word "non" modifies the phrase
"bargaining unit employees," in which case job shoppers would
certainly be encompassed.

In the alternative, "non-bargaining

unit employees" may be interpreted to mean employees of the
Employer who are not within the bargaining unit by concluding
that the phrase "non-bargaining unit" modifies the word "employees
in which case job shoppers must first be classified as "employees'
of the Company before Article II would be applicable to them.
The Union asserts that the purpose of Article II is to
protect bargaining unit work in a broad sense so that the former
interpretation should obtain.

On the other hand, the Company

views Article II in the more limited sense as being concerned with
personnel who work directly for the Company.

The parties have

referred the Arbitrator to two prior arbitration awards that involve Article II.

They are: General Dynamics Corporation,

Electric Boat Division v. Marine Draftsmen's Association, Port
of New London, MDA 15-7 (1978

(Stutz, Arb.) (hereafter referred

to as the Freon Case) and General Dynamics Corporation, Electric
Boat Division v. Marine Draftsmen's Association, Port of New
London, MDA 50-7 (1978) (Fallen, Arb.).

Both cases involved
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Those cases

are relevant to but not determinative of the ambiguity of Article
II.

Both cases would fall within the scope of Article II regard-

less of which interpretation is applied to the expression, "nonbargaining unit employees."

Furthermore, the language of

Arbitrator Stutz in the Freon Case, cited by the Company in its
reply brief at pages 29-30, is also not probative of the ambiguitj
of Article II.

That opinion indicated that, "Article II was

aimed at protecting against the Company assigning work normally
done by bargaining unit personnel to non-bargaining unit personnel
within the Groton facility . . . . " (Freon Case at 5)(emphasis
added).)

The word "within" may be interpreted to apply to any

persons at Groton not belonging to the bargaining unit or to employees of the Employer at Groton not belonging to the bargaining
unit.
To resolve such uncertainties, resort to well settled rules
of contract construction is appropriate.

Here the rule "expressio

unius est^ exclusio alterius" applies and is determinative.
General language followed by specific language that expressly
includes a class is deemed to restrict the scope of the general
language.

Accordingly, the reference in the third paragraph of

Article II to "salaried positions" and

Jlsalaried

non-supervisory

personnel" is persuasive evidence that the parties intended to
encompass in Article II only employees of the Employer who are
not within the bargaining unit.

For the Arbitrator to interpret

Article II to apply to job shoppers would not only ignore this
rule of construction but would add to the terms of the agreement.
Article VI, Section 2 cautions that: "The arbitrator shall have
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no power to alter, amend, change, add to, or subtract from any
terms of the Agreement . . . ."in the absence of any persuasive
a/idence concerning the bargaining history of Article II that the
parties mutually intended to address the use of job shoppers, I
find that Article II applies only to employees of the Employer
who are not within the bargaining unit.

As job shoppers are not

such employees, Article II does not apply to them.
This finding is consistent with another well recognized
rule of construction-namely that an agreement be construed as a
whole.

Therefore under the foregoing interpretations of Article

I and II, the use of job shoppers is still subject to the requirements set forth in Article XXXI.
Article XXXI
The parties disagree over whether the use of job shoppers
constitutes subcontracting under the collective bargaining agreement.

The agreement does not define the term "subcontracting"

and does not refer to or distinguish between "farming in11 or
"farming out" work.

The contracts between the Company and the

job shops expressly provided that the job shops are subcontractors
There is no persuasive evidence that these contracts were pretextual, sham or subterfuge.

Indeed, in the absence of a find-

ing of bad faith or unlawful anti-union animus, the propriety of
these contracts stand unimpaired.

When this finding is viewed

in conjunction with the general practice of using job shoppers
in the marine design industry, it is logical to conclude that
the use of job shoppers has been treated as and is subcontracting
within the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement.

In

-18reaching this conclusion, the fact that the Company had not used
job shoppers in the past—except during the 1979-1980 strike
during which no collective bargaining agreement was in effect-is immaterial because the record does not indicate that circumstances existed that warranted the use of job shoppers.

The

evidence pertaining to an agreement in 1975, whereby an employee
of the Electro-Dynamics Division of General Dynamics performed
non-bargaining

unit work pursuant to an agreement with the Union

that it "shall not constitute a precedent for any purpose whatsoever" (Union Exhibit 7), is immaterial in any respect due to
the express provision that no precedential value is to be accorded
to it.

Simply put, considering the historic use of job shoppers

in this industry, and the imprecise contract language of the subcontracting clause on the issue, the Union has not proved its
case that Article XXXI prohibits job shoppers.
The use of the term "job shoppers" in paragraph 11 of the
Strike Settlement Agreement (Joint Exhibit 3) does not prove that
job shoppers are not covered by Article XXXI.
the question either way.

It does not answer

It acknowledges that job shoppers are

a part of the marine design industry, at least as replacements
during a strike, but does not deal with their use at other times„
Considering my interpretation of the relationship between
Articles I and II, the most logical and factually warranted
connection between job shopping and the agreement is Article
XXXI. In other words, job shopping is subcontracting,
subject to the conditions of Article XXXI.
In concluding that job shopping is a form of subcontracting

-19it is significant that the practice under the MTC collective
bargaining agreement (which is where the language contained in
Article XXXI originated) includes on premises contracting.

This

finding is buttressed by the statement of the Company's Chief
Negotiator, Thomas Sotir, during the negotiations that the Compan}
had the right to use job shoppers under the collective bargaining
agreement.

(See XI/64).

Article XXXI limits the Employer's right to subcontract.
It is undisputed in the instant case that the job shoppers performed work normally performed by MDA employees and that proper
facilities were available.

Thus the remaining question is,

whether under Article XXXI MDA employees were available and
whether the Employer intended to deprive employees of continuing
work.

The issue can be characterized in more traditional terms,

naemly, whether there was a bona fide business necessity to use
job shoppers and/or whether using job shoppers was done in bad
faith.

(See generally S. Wallen, How Issues of Subcontracting

and Plant Removal Are Handled by Arbitrators, 19 Ind. & La. Rel.
Rev. 265 (1966) (contrasts situations when agreement is silent
with when the contract as here, contains a subcontracting clause)
The Business Necessity Issue
The Company used job shoppers from December 12, 1980 (III/
60) to September 25, 1981 (XII/19 & XIII/3).

The Company viewed

this as a temporary measure to alleviate a shortage of permanent
employees that had caused schedule slippage and production problems (XI/101 & 182; VI/41).
were on lay-off.

It is undisputed that no MDA employee

The record reflects that MDA employees continued
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Article

VIII entitled "Hours of Employment and Overtime Rates" does not
guarantee overtime.

Consequently, and as is well settled in that

circumstance, the Employer did not have a duty to use overtime to
deal with the production problem.
In determining whether MDA employees were available within
the meaning of Article XXXI, however, it is noteworthy that
Company Exhibit 47 reflects that the MDA employees in Departments
459, 460 and 480 continued to work overtime from November 1980
to August 1981, which encompasses the time period when job
shoppers were present.

For example, Department 459 worked 14,159

hours of overtime during the four-week period from November 29
to December 20, 1980 (before the job shoppers arrived) and worked
15,276 hours of overtime during the five-week period from February
28 to March 29, 1981 (after the job shoppers arrived).

Thus

Department 459 worked an average of 3540 hours of overtime per
week during the time period immediately before the arrival of
job shoppers compared with an average of 3055 hours of overtime
after the job shoppers arrived.

In this connection, Company Ex-

hibit 46 indicates that 104 job shoppers were present in Department 459 on March 1 and 95 were present on April 1, 1981.

Thus

at the peak of the use of job shoppers in Department 459, the MDA
employees continued to work overtime at approximately 85 percent
of the earlier level.

The Arbitrator has no authority to

substitute his judgment for that of the Company in determining
under that circumstance whether the available work should have
been handled by more overtime.

Similarly, the evidence concern-
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ing loans and transfers do

not establish that the Company was

required to or could have used this approach to eliminate the
production shortfall.
With respect to measuring the availability of MDA employees
during the relevant period, the Union's charge that the recall
was delayed is a non-sequitur.
recall arrangements
enforcement.

The parties negotiated the phased

themselves and each side is entitled to its

For the Arbitrator to draw an inference that em-

ployees would have been available had they been recalled more
quickly is to negate what the parties agreed to bilaterally and
prejudicially divest the Company of a right the Union gave it.
The record is clear that the Employer attempted to hire
persons for the MDA bargaining unit before it engaged job shopper
and while job shoppers worked at the Company's facilities.

Al-

though by hindsight certain hiring decisions might have been made
earlier and certain efforts arguably might have been refined,
these circumstances do not refute the basic fact that the Company
attempted to hire such personnel and was unable to do so quickly.
I am persuaded that as soon as the Company hired suitable persons
the job shopping program ended.

In addition, the evidence that

some members of the bargaining unit may have been idle is inadequate and, in any event so few such employees were identified
as to provide no evidentiary basis regarding conditions throughout the entire bargaining unit.

Nor is there a probative point

to the claim by the Union that the type of work the job shoppers
performed was the lowest level drafting work.

It has not been

shown to my satisfaction that there was not a business need for
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such work or that job shoppers were not need to do it.

For all

of these reasons, the Union has not shown that MDA employees were
available within the meaning of Article XXXI.
The Bad Faith Issue
If the Employer's decision and actions regarding the use of
job shoppers were in bad faith or based on an unlawful anti-union
animus, the evidence does not prove it.
It cannot be denied that the realtionship between the
parties as a result of the 1979-1980 strike was angry and strained.

But the admission into evidence of Union Exhibit 8 ( the

NLRB Notice and Complaint) was for "historical purposes" and not
as evidence of "unfair practices."

As the Strike Settlement

Agreement expressly provided for the withdrawal of that complaint
"with prejudice" (Joint Exhibit 3, Paragraph 8), it cannot now be
deemed as proof of its underlying claims or findings.
Though throughout this arbitration case the Union claimed
that the Employer's motivations were to weaken if not destroy the
Union and that the use of job shoppers was a calculated part of
that plan, the evidence in support of that serious charge, if not
completely lacking, is markedly inadequare to meet what I
consider to be the requisite "clear and convincing" standard and
burden.
The evidence is not persuasive that the Company should have
farmed out the work.

Witnesses for the Company credibly testi-

fied concerning the impracticability of doing so. (See e.g.,
Steamer at XII/8-9; Company Brief and citations therein at 54-55.)
Accordingly, there is insufficient evidence in this connection to
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prove bad faith.
The Union asserts that the Company's refusal to disclose
the full scope of the job shop program in early December 1980
indicated its bad faith.

This so-called "camel in the tent"

issue is not persuasive.

It cannot be said that the Company acted

in bad faith by disclosing its plan only after it knew the full
magnitude of its needs.

Of course, that is not to say

that an

earlier involvement of the Union would not have been a good idea.
(Cf. Ashton, XI/34).

Rather, it is to say that bifurcated dis-

closure of the magnitude of the job shop program is not, under
the overall circumstances, an act or proof of bad faith.
The stipulation by the parties that job shoppers earned
"substantially higher compensation than MDA represented employees
performing that work in bargaining unit job classifications who
have comparable or greater work experience" (IX/44) is not
persuasive evidence of bad faith.

Instead, it demonstrates, not

surprisingly that the marketplace requires the payment of a
"premium" for temporary workers to forgo the advantages of a
permanent position.

As such, and as a matter of law, it cannot

be viewed as undermining the Union.

The evidence is also not

persuasive that the Company used job shoppers to realize a windfall profit from the Navy.
The claim by the Union that the Company failed to disclose
certain documents pursuant to the full disclosure provision of
the grievance procedure (Article VI, Section 2) is rejected.

By

the end of the 15 hearings in this case, all such material disputes
were resolved.

Both sides were afforded full opportunity to meet

-24-

the evidence and allegations advanced by the other.

I am

satisfied that the intent of the full disclosure provision was
completely satisfied.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate the contract
by bringing in "job shop" personnel to
perform MDA bargaining unit work on the
Employer's premises. The grievance is
denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March 14, 1983
STATE OF New York )gt
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPEIU, Local 106
and

OPINION
and
AWARD

Electric Boat Coinmunity
Federal Credit Union

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Employer violate Article XXII of
the contract in awarding the Senior Loan
Interview job to Judith Andrade instead
of to Rebecca Gerrish? If so, what shall
be the remedy?
A hearing was held on August 29, 1983 at which time
Ms. Gerrish, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and
representatives of the above named Union and Employer appeared,
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Union and the Employer filed post-hearing briefs.
The basic question is whether the Employer had the contractual right to by-pass the grievant, who had the greater
seniority, and award the job of Senior Loan Interviewer to the
junior employee, Judith Andrade.
The pertinent parts of Article XXII Promotions, Bidding,
and Job Posting are Sections 1 and 3 which read:
1. Promotions are hereby defined as a
move from a lower to a higher rated job.
It is the intention of the Employer to
fill vacancies from within the Credit
Union before hiring new employees, provided employees are available with the
necessary qualifications to fill the
vacant position.

-23. Promotions shall be made on the
basis of necessary qualifications and
ability required for the job. The
final selection shall be made by the
Employer. Seniority shall be the determining factor where two or more employees
having the same qualifications and ability
bid for the same job. The trial period
for determination of ability and qualifications for the job bid upon shall not exceed
twenty (20) working days, unless extended
by mutual agreement between the Employer
and the Union. An employee who fails to
qualify for the new job shall be permitted
to return to his former job. Only employees
bidding for such positions shall have recourse to the grievance procedures.
It was stipulated that Judith Andrade was "more qualified"
than the grievant.

Though the parties disagree on whether the

grievant possessed the threshold "necessary qualifications and
ability for the job," I am persuaded that she did, requiring at
most a minimum amount of training or job familiarization had her
bid been granted.
However, I find the contract language clear and unambiguous and supportive of the Employer's position.

That being so,

as well settled, past practice, bargaining history, and ad hoc
arrangements between the Union and the Employer representatives
in other matters are immaterial.
My interpretation of Sections 1 and 3 differ from that of
the Union in one

critical area.

I do not read the third sen-

tence of Section 3 to require the promotion of the senior bidder
if that bidder possesses the "necessary qualifications and
ability for the job."

Nor do I find that phrase synonymous with

the circumstance where "two or more employees hav(e) the same

-3qualifications and ability...for the same job" (emphasis added).
Rather I accept and interpret the language as written, namely
that the seniority of a bidder is to be determinative when that
bidder and a junior bidder possess the same qualifications and
ability.

Of course, as is undisputed herein, if the senior

bidder is also the most qualified and with the most ability, the
contract mandates his selection.
My interpretation of Sections 1 and 3 is as follows:
Section 1 requires the Employer to promote from within if
there are incumbent employees with the "necessary" or "minimum
qualifications" for the vacancy.

This creates a presumption in

favor of "in-house" employees and prohibits the Employer from
going to the outside for new hires when minimally qualified
incumbent employees are available.
The first and second sentence of Section 3 establishes an
eligible pool of incumbent employees from which the Employer
shall make the selection.

In that pool are all bidders who

possess the "necessary qualifications and ability."

The third

sentence of Section 3,
"Seniority shall be the determining factor
where two or more employees having the same
qualifications and ability bid for the same
job,"
requires the Employer
to choose the most senior bidder when,
as has been the case in the vast percentage of past promotions,
he possesses either the most ability and qualifications or at
least as much ability and qualifications as the other bidders,
but also gives the Employer the right to choose a junior bidder
over a senior bidder where, infrequently as here, the former

-4possesses greater ability and/or qualifications.
The balance of Section 3, referring to a "trial period"
obviously obtains to circumstances not present in this case,
where the bidder selected has either not yet demonstrated
"ability and qualifications," and/or where the selected bidder
turns out to be unable "to qualify" or to perform the new job
satisfactorily within the prescribed twenty (20) working days.
The bargaining history, past practice and discussions on
one or more other prior cases between Mr. Bruno of the Union
and Mr. Kinney of the Employer are not sufficiently clear or
onesided to constitute a mutual change in or an amendment to
the foregoing contract language.

Hence those prior matters are

preempted by the contract.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Employer did not violate Article XXII
of the contract in awarding the Senior
Loan Interviewer job to Judith Andrade instead of to Rebecca Gerrish.

DATED: November 25, 1983
STATE OF New York )
SS "
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument which is my AWARD.

